



## The long arm of diplomacy



Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi snapped, before the talks.



# **JINNAH-GANDHI TALKS**

(September, 1914.)

Text of correspondence and other  
relevant documents etc.

Foreword by  
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, M.L.A.

CENTRAL OFFICE  
ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE



# CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword	a
Rajagopalachari-Jinnah correspondence.	i
Mr. Jinnah's Speech before the A. I. M. I. Council on 30th July at Lahore.	v
Joint Statement of Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi released to the Press, along with the text of correspondence, on September 27, 1944.	1
Jinnah-Gandhi Correspondence	2
Mr. Gandhi's first Speech after breakdown of negotiations.	53
Mr. Gandhi's Press Statement dated 28th September 1944.	56
Mr. Gandhi's interview to the repre- sentative of the "News Chronicle" on 29th September 1944.	64
Mr. Jinnah's Statement at a Press Conference held on 4th October 1944.	66
Mr. Jinnah's interview to the representative of the "News	

Chronicle". London on 4th October 1944.	75
Mr. Jinnah's interview to the representative of the "Daily Worker." London on 5th October 1944.	79

## APPENDICES.

A. Lahore Resolution (1940) of the All India Muslim League.	83
B. C. R. Formula.	85
C. Mr. Gandhi's Proposal dated 24th September 1944.	87
D. Jagat Narain Lal's Resolution of the All India Congress Committee.	88
E. August (1942) Resolution of the All India Congress Committee.	89

---

## FOREWORD.

In forming our opinion on the negotiations between Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi at Bombay, we should study the sequence of events as well as the text of the correspondence which is published in this brochure.

On April 8, 1944, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari sent a letter to Mr. Jinnah enclosing what is called the Rajaji formula which he described as "the basis for a settlement which I discussed with Gandhiji in March, 1943, and of which he expressed full approval". It was followed by another letter in which Mr. Rajagopalachari expressed disappointment that the President of the Muslim League was unable to approve of the terms. The fact was that Mr. Jinnah expressed his willingness to place the formula before the Working Committee of the Muslim League as he could not individually take the responsibility of accepting or rejecting it. Here it may be noted that the formula was not open to discussion or any modification. Mr. Rajagopalachari would not agree to such a perfectly constitutional course, but strangely





## FOREWORD.

In forming our opinion on the negotiations between Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Gandhi at Bombay, we should study the sequence of events as well as the text of the correspondence which is published in this brochure.

On April 8, 1944, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari sent a letter to Mr. Jinnah enclosing what is called the Rajaji formula which he described as "the basis for a settlement which I discussed with Gandhiji in March, 1943, and of which he expressed full approval". It was followed by another letter in which Mr. Rajagopalachari expressed disappointment that the President of the Muslim League was unable to approve of the terms. The fact was that Mr. Jinnah expressed his willingness to place the formula before the Working Committee of the Muslim League as he could not individually take the responsibility of accepting or rejecting it. Here it may be noted that the formula was not open to discussion or any modification. Mr. Rajagopalachari would not agree to such a perfectly constitutional course, but *strangely*



with his collaborator, for more than a year like a dead secret. Meanwhile, there was another significant move of Mr. Gandhi *vis-a-vis* the Viceroy to reach an understanding, a move which was not revealed to Mr. Jinnah as the parallel correspondence with him was in progress. Let us see how Mr. Gandhi's overtures to the Viceroy were timed.

It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi arranged an interview to Mr. Stuart Gelder, correspondent of the News Chronicle, in which he gave his views on the situation for the indirect edification of Lord Wavell. This correspondent was to be an intermediary between the Congress Dictator and the Viceroy just as another Englishman, Mr. Reginald Reynolds, had been engaged to carry a letter from Mr. Gandhi to the then Viceroy, Lord Irwin. Instead of using the Post Office, Mr. Gandhi preferred this courier system which undoubtedly adds to the lustre of Congress publicity. What happened was that the Gelder move "misfired"—the Mahatma's word—whereupon Mr. Gandhi wrote on July 15 from Panchgani to the Viceroy calling Lord Wavell's attention to the Stuart Gelder affair. Lord Wavell replied in a letter dated July 22 asking the Mahatma for a definite and

constructive policy for His Excellency to consider. Five days later, on July 27, 1944, Mr. Gandhi replied stating that the time had come, at last, for friendly talks. Next, on August 15, 1944 (nineteen days after the despatch of Mr. Gandhi's letter) Lord Wavell sent his answer containing a statement of Government policy as against Mr. Gandhi's "concrete proposal of a National Government" responsible to the elected members of the Assembly, the majority of whom are Hindus. In other words, there was no change. My surmise is that in the long interval the Viceroy must have contacted Whitehall to formulate the policy stated in the letter under reference. It is parallel to this private correspondence with Lord Wavell which was hid from Mr. Jinnah's eyes, that a brief exchange of letters took place between Mr. Gandhi and the President of the Muslim League. Mark the dates again. On July 17, Mr. Gandhi writes from Panchgani to Mr. Jinnah at Srinagar a letter accompanied by a transla-

( e )

convenient time. Later Mr. Jinnah informed him from Bombay that August 19 would be suitable but unfortunately he took ill and his doctors forbade him against undertaking any work involving strain. The matter was promptly conveyed to Sevagram and later September 9 was fixed for the first meeting which took place according to the scheduled time.

Meanwhile Mr. Jinnah had at the meeting of the Council of the League at Lahore publicly examined the contents of Rajaji's formula pointing out how the proposal was a disfigured caricature of the Pakistan idea, but he welcomed the intimation of Mr. Gandhi that he had agreed to the division of India. The progress of the talks was fortunately brought on record at the suggestion of Mr. Gandhi that letters had better be exchanged for purposes of record and clarification. I give important dates in this story of concurrent correspondence.

Dateline.

Subject Matter.

Panchgani, July 15.	Stuart Gelder's story
Gandhi to Wavell.	and the suggestion
	that Mr. Gandhi
	should be allowed to

contact his colleagues  
in the detention  
camp or outside.

- Panchgani, July 17. "We must meet".  
Gandhi to Jinnah.
- New Delhi, July 22. Asks for definite and  
Wavell to Gandhi. constructive policy.
- Srinagar, July 24. Consenting to meet.  
Jinnah to Gandhi.
- Panchgani, July 27. Asks for friendly talks  
Gandhi to Wavell. with Viceroy making  
concrete proposal.
- New Delhi, Aug. 15. "Banging the door"  
Wavell to Gandhi. as the Congress Press  
put it.
- August 19. Date for interview  
originally fixed.
- September 9. Gandhi-Jinnah talks  
begin.

The inference is clear that while wooing Lord Wavell, Mr. Gandhi was also alive to the impression it could create once it was known that the Gandhi-Jinnah talks *might* result in a Hindu-Muslim settlement, thus opening a new phase of concerted action both by the Hindus and

the Muslims to demand the transfer of power from the British Government. The prospect of a Hindu-Muslim concordat is the only nightmare which British diehards and vested interests could ever have in respect of India, since they could not thereafter trade on the plea of Hindu-Muslim disunity in the country. The dates indicate that Mr. Gandhi wished Lord Wavell to know that if a friendly response to his advances did not materialise, he would form an alliance with the Muslim League which had been foreboded by his acceptance of the C.P. formula which stood for the Government of India as principle and policy. With the new statement of policy contained in the Viceroy's letter of August 16, 1944 which had already become a public document, Mr. Gandhi found himself left almost dry by the British Government's lack of commitment to meet the demands of the Congress on August 16. He was determined to be no change of the existing situation until the termination of the current though agreement for the two parties to work the existing formula would loosen the reins and allow the country to pass to the hands of a Provisional Government on footing between the Hindu



mans in the formation of the Executive. But then that would frustrate Mr. Gandhi's ambition to instal a "National Government" responsible to the Hindu majority in the Assembly who would be under the thumb of the Congress High Command and the vested interests with which the Congress is becoming increasingly and insidiously merged for the control of power.

Mr. Gandhi met Mr. Jinnah. He maintained that he represented nobody but himself, an awkward position for the President of the Muslim League in the matter of negotiations. Nevertheless, Mr. Jinnah put up with what really is a fond pretence of the Congress Dictator.

I am glad that the exchange of ideas and explanations were put in black and white for two reasons. It is an education to the public. Secondly, it protects the President of the Muslim League (at least in the eyes of impartial observers) against false accusations and mendacious versions of what happened.

I would like to draw the attention of readers to a few salient features of the Rajaji formula. The last clause states that the terms of the settlement proposed

would be binding only if the British Government transferred full power. A settlement, if it is genuine, must be accepted and should remain honoured on its intrinsic merits, but Mr. Rajagopalachari wanted it as an opportunistic manoeuvre. British statesmen are too shrewd for this kind of thing, nor do Mussulmans want a superficial patch-up to over-awe the British Government and make them part with power in order to validate the terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement. Further the Rajaji formula wants a district-wise plebiscite to be taken in the Pakistan provinces, the test being the recording of an absolute majority of adults in favour of separation or against it. It was a subtle move to riddle the fabric of Pakistan with so many holes and pockets, and it was calculated therefore to sabotage the whole scheme of dividing British India into Pakistan and Hindustan, the former containing a majority of Muslims and the latter a majority of Hindus, both the Sovereign States being affianced if they so will, by treaties and engagements as sovereign units and pledged by the bonds of reciprocity to the principle of a fair deal and no discrimination for the citizens of both areas. There was no plebiscite in Ireland when Ulster and Eire separated,

(j)

nor was any plebiscite taken at the time of Separation of Burma or Ceylon from India. In fact there are many other instances of a similar kind in the Constitutional history of the World. But in the case of Pakistan Mr. Rajagopalachari, himself something of an autocrat while in office, has become suddenly enamoured of a vote by all the adults so that an absolute majority could be secured.

Many people do not understand the implications of the term "absolute majority" on which Mr. Gandhi also insisted. An absolute majority in the legal and constitutional sense has a definite meaning and no district would be qualified or eligible to be included in the proposed Pakistan areas unless a majority could be secured not only of those who go to the polling booths but of the total number of the voters irrespective of the fact whether they exercise their right of vote or not. In other words an absolute majority is not merely a clear majority of those who take the trouble of voting but it is a majority against all combinations, active or potential, by the token of the register of voters and the ballot box.

Only two points would I mention in

connection with Mr. Gandhi's contentions as found in the correspondence. Beginning with the plea that he favoured the Rajaji formula, he upon the joint examination with Mr. Jinnah of its defects performed a somersault saying that the Rajaji formula lay "shunted off" the rails. Very unnecessarily he raised conundrums about the Two Nations Theory, the status of converts, the place of Pan-Islamism in Pakistan and other issues remote from the simple question of arriving at a Hindu-Muslim settlement. Indian Muslims to-day claim that they constitute a nation by every test of definition but what is more vital they are profoundly conscious of their sense of nationality; they are also aware of the spirit of Hindu renaissance and the Caste-Hindu Imperialism that has expressed itself through Congress activities apart from the ideology and social outlook of the Hindus which differentiate their political aims. Mr. Gandhi would not in his replies explain his ideas of a transitional Government and its authority during the transition, whereas the Muslim claim is that once the principle of Pakistan is accepted, constitution-making bodies could be formed to adjust differences, if need be with the aid of experts to solve particular difficulties. The Muslim

case has been misrepresented in many quarters but a study of the letters that passed between the two leaders would reveal how close to realities Mr. Jinnah moved and how anxiously he sought clarification on the practical aspects of the problem, explaining in turn any point on which Mr. Gandhi wanted further light.

When the negotiations broke down, both of them subscribed to a statement to the effect that they regarded negotiations as not having been closed and Mr. Gandhi when he was pressed by the representatives of the Press said that the matter stood adjourned *sine die*. Unfortunately Mr. Gandhi indulged in misrepresentations after the event in order to make Mr. Jinnah appear as the one obstacle to a settlement. Upon the question of the leakage of correspondence and other invidious matters I need not dwell. Mr. Gandhi was not serious about a settlement as his letter to Mr. Jinnah had made it appear and as the days passed he constantly changed his ground zigzagging between the Rajaji formula and his own "proposal". It is amazing that he should claim to have conceded the essence of the Lahore Resolution while he is reluctant

to accept the Lahore Resolution itself.

The day after the breakdown, Mr. Gandhi's own paper voicing as it does his views, came out saying that the Muslim League should repudiate Mr. Jinnah's leadership and find someone else to speak for Muslim India. If this is the lesson they have learnt from the failure of the talks, I can only say that I am sorry for our Hindu friends. From all parts of India the Muslims upon learning about the failure and also understanding the nature of the correspondence released, expressed their unabated confidence in their leader. There has been regret over the failure of the talks, but it is, perhaps deeper among the Muslims as a whole since their case had been put by Mr. Jinnah in moderation and by a searching analysis of all the facts and proposals that pertain to a Hindu-Muslim settlement. Now that Muslims have a clear goal, they are far more self-possessed in their political argument than the Hindus who dream still of the politics that would lead them to All-India domination and who at the same time realise in their waking hours that it is impossible for them to achieve. I hope Mussalmans of light and leading will find this book a valuable work of reference and

( n )

explain to their followers the meaning of the differences that came to the surface. Let it also serve as a source of reference for impartial observers who are not participants in the Hindu-Muslim dispute and be of use to them in understanding the case of Muslim India.

(Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan

New Delhi,  
November 25, 1944.

## RAJAGOPALACHARI-JINNAH CORRESPONDENCE.

---

Letter from Mr. Rajagopalachari to Mr. Jinnah.

NEW DELHI, April 8, 1944.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Here is the basis for a settlement which I discussed with Gandhiji in March 1943, and of which he expressed full approval. He then authorized me to signify his approval of these terms should I be able to convince you of their being just and fair to all. As the Government have refused to relax any of the restrictions imposed on him to enable him to discuss or negotiate terms of any settlement, I write this to you on his behalf and hope that this will bring about a final settlement of the most unfortunate impasse we are in. You are aware of the intensity of my desire for a settlement. I was very glad when I found it possible to obtain Gandhiji's approval of these terms. I hope that you will bestow your fullest thought on the justice and fairness of these proposals and help to terminate a condition of affairs which is steadily causing all-round deterioration in the country.

Yours sincerely,

Enclosure : C. R. Formula.

C. Rajagopalachari.

(Appendix B.)

Letter from Mr. Rajagopalachari to Mr. Jinnah.

Dear Mr. Jinnah, NEW DELHI, April 17, 1944.

The proposal I gave you in writing when we last met in Delhi must be still with you and perhaps you have read it over again and given further thought





## RAJAGOPALACHARI-JINNAH CORRESPONDENCE.

---

**Letter from Mr. Rajagopalachari to Mr. Jinnah.**

NEW DELHI, April 8, 1944.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Here is the basis for a settlement which I discussed with Gandhiji in March 1943, and of which he expressed full approval. He then authorized me to signify his approval of these terms should I be able to convince you of their being just and fair to all. As the Government have refused to relax any of the restrictions imposed on him to enable him to discuss or negotiate terms of any settlement, I write this to you on his behalf and hope that this will bring about a final settlement of the most unfortunate impasse we are in. You are aware of the intensity of my desire for a settlement. I was very glad when I found it possible to obtain Gandhiji's approval of these terms. I hope that you will bestow your fullest thought on the justice and fairness of these proposals and help to terminate a condition of affairs which is steadily causing all-round deterioration in the country.

Yours sincerely,

Enclosure : C. R. Formula.

C. Rajagopalachari.

(Appendix B.)

**Letter from Mr. Rajagopalachari to Mr. Jinnah.**

Dear Mr. Jinnah, NEW DELHI, April 17, 1944.

The proposal I gave you in writing when we last met in Delhi must be still with you and perhaps you have read it over again and given further thought

to it. I was much disappointed, as you are aware, at your inability to approve of the terms. But I hope you may perhaps reconsider your position. I sincerely believe that the proposals form a fair and satisfactory basis of settlement. I shall be grateful to hear from you as to whether you have reconsidered the matter

Yours sincerely,  
C. Rajagopalachari.

**Telegram from Mr. Rajagopalachari  
to Mr. Jinnah,**

POONA, June 30, 1944.

Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Guest House, Srinagar.

My letter dated April 17, touching matter personally discussed on April 8 remains yet unanswered. Have now met Gandhiji who still holds by formula presented to you by me. I would like now publish the formula and your rejection. This telegrams is sent with Gandhiji's approval. I would like you at this juncture to reconsider your rejection.

C. Rajagopalachari.  
Dilkusha, Panchgani,

**Telegram from Mr. Jinnah to  
Mr. Rajagopalachari**

SRINAGAR, July 2, 1944.

Mr. Rajagopalachari, Dilkusha, Panchgani.

Your request to publish your formula. Your wrong version our talk that I rejected your formula is unfair suprising. True facts are I was willing place your formula before Working Committee Muslim League although it was not open to any modification but you did not agree allow me to do

so. Hence no further step was taken. My reaction was that I could not personally take responsibility of accepting or rejecting it and my position remains same today. If Mr. Gandhi even now sends me direct his proposal I am willing place it before Muslim League Working Committee.

M. A. JINNAH.

**Telegram from Mr. Rajagopalachari  
to Mr. Jinnah**

PANCHGANI, July 4, 1944.

Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Guest House, Srinagar.

Thanks telegram. My letter April 17 showed how I felt over what I thought was rejection of formula so far as you were personally concerned. Shall be glad indeed if as your telegram suggests you did not reject it. Gandhiji though not vested with representative or special authority in this matter definitely approved my proposal and authorized me to approach you on that basis. Now again he reaffirms his assent. Weight of his opinion would most probably secure Congress acceptance. You were unwilling to accept my formula, but were willing to place it before League Council. I think no purpose served by such procedure so long as it does not have your own support.

C. Rajagopalachari.

Dilkusha, Panchgan

**Telegram from Mr. Jinnah to  
Mr. Rajagopalachari**

RINAGAR, July 5, 1944

Mr. Rajagopalachari, Dilkusha, Panchgan

Regret unable to go beyond my telegram

M. A. JINNAH

( IV )

Telegram From Mr. Rajagopalachari  
to Mr. Jinnah.

PANCHGANI, July 8, 1944.

Mr. Jinnah, Guest House, Srinagar.

Your telegram of 5th received today. With it private negotiation ends. It is necessary take public into confidence now. I am accordingly releasing entire correspondence ending your wire 5th.

C. Rajagopalachari.

## MR. JINNAH'S SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE COUNCIL HELD ON THE 30th JULY, 1944, AT LAHORE

Since the release of Mr. Gandhi there has been a flood of statements, Press reports and comments, and I have tried to follow all this as carefully as it is possible for me to do so, particularly with reference to what is called by Mr. Rajagopalachari his formula for the Hindu-Muslim settlement, and for the moment I wish to deal with that matter. Burying the past and starting from that point, let us examine the position.

On the 18th May 1944 Mr. Gandhi's letter to me from prison of May 4th 1943 was released because, it was stated, "Dawn" had asked for its publication, and that it was owing to the public that the letter should see the light of the day. Hence the release of the letter under Mr. Gandhi's instructions. In that letter Mr. Gandhi says: "I have followed the proceedings of the League as reported in the "Dawn" columns. I noted your invitation to me to write to you. Hence this letter. I welcome your invitation. I suggest our meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands. I hope that this letter will be sent to you and, if you agree to my proposal, that the Government will let you visit me. One thing I had better mention. There seems to be an 'if' about your invitation. Do you say I should write only if I have changed my heart? God alone knows men's hearts. I would like you to take me as I am."

I knew the substance of this letter, because the Government had furnished me with it at the time

and in my statement I pointed out that it was not the kind of letter that I expected from Mr. Gandhi in response to the appeal which I made in my speech in April 1943 in my presidential address to the Muslim League. It has now been fully borne out without a shadow of doubt that Mr. Gandhi understood that there was an "if" about my invitation, which was evaded, but nevertheless, as usual, the entire Congress Press accused me of having gone back on my word, and did everything in their power to misrepresent, vilify and mutilate my speech. That "if" still remains and the letter still remains undelivered to me. While Mr. Gandhi was busy, and there had been a plethora of correspondence between him, from the Aga Khan's palace at Poona, and the Viceroy, and since his release he has been well enough to see numerous prominent men from day to day and to carry on correspondence with the Viceroy and others, he has not, however, thought it proper to send me even a copy of that letter, being the addressee of the original (but thought fit to release it to the Press).

Then comes the next chapter. After all his efforts had failed to establish contact with Lord Linlithgow to negotiate with him over the head of the Muslim League, completely ignoring and by-passing it, he sought an interview with Lord Wavell, his dear friend, conveying to him ad nauseam that he was a friend of the British nation and a loyal son of the British Empire and that he should be allowed to meet the members of his Working Committee in prison or they should be released, and for that purpose he said: "I plead now as a free man for such permission. If you will see me before deciding, I shall gladly go wherever you want me to." This request of his

was refused by the Viceroy by his letter of June 22nd. This "No" to Mr. Gandhi. it was reported, cast a gloom on Poona. But even the final effort of Mr. Gandhi through the British journalist Mr. Gelder as a go-between to link him up with Lord Wavell was a misfire. At this psychological moment Rajagopalachari was at Poona, and suddenly I received a telegram from him on June 30th, as another go-between, complaining without any reason that his letter of April 8th remained unanswered, although he knew perfectly well that it required no answer, as the answer was already given to him, and threatening me that he would like to publish the formula and my rejection. He said he had sent the telegram with Mr. Gandhi's approval, and further warned me that he would like me at this juncture to reconsider my rejection. In my reply I pointed out to him that his version that I had rejected the formula was wrong, and I am glad that he does not contradict the true facts as stated by me but confirms them. The correspondence was, however, abruptly released to the Press, so that I should stand on my trial before the bar of the public opinion of the world and of India, and especially of the Mussalmans. Immediately the word had passed, and the Congress Press framed various grave charges against me. To give a few instances in some of the so-called responsible newspapers: "Irresponsible and ill-considered reply from one who claims to speak for his community is nothing short of a betrayal of his community and the country at large. It is now up to the Muslim community to judge the offer on its merits and find the leader or leaders who will play the game." These charges like "Intoxicated with ego and "Ucompromising attitude", "A block in the freedom of India". It was urged that M



## (VIII)

should be sacked or made to retire by Muslim India, and so on and so forth. It is surprising that even Mr. Gandhi at this juncture has encouraged this propaganda both in this country and abroad by the enemies of the Muslim League, by stating in his interview on July 13th, that the British Government is using me as a cloak, and that this "diabolical conspiracy to stifle India's aspirations must be broken." This is the background of the so-called negotiations for a Hindu-Muslim settlement started by Mr. Rajagopalachari with the approval of Mr. Gandhi, and from the mass of varying statements and contradictions to-day only one essential issue emerges, namely that I am put on my trial and that I have now to defend myself. Thus the private negotiations ended. My only sin was that I requested Mr. Rajagopalachari to allow me to place his proposal before my Working Committee, and that as Mr. Gandhi was no longer in prison, I requested that he should directly communicate to me whatever proposals he may choose to put forward, assuring him that I would place them before my Working Committee. What was the objection to such a course? I fail to appreciate the line adopted by Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari, and I am willing to face the verdict of the Muslim League and any other independent and impartial men in India or abroad.

This is so far as the procedure adopted. Now we come to the form of the formula. These proposals were not open to any discussion or modification. It was on the basis of "take it or leave it". It seems that the Congress philosophy goes one better than the British imperialism. Even the Cripps proposals had the sanction behind them of His Majesty's Government, and His Majesty's Government sent one of the members of the Cabinet

all the way to India to personally approach the Congress and the Muslim League. Not only that, Sir Stafford Cripps was closetted with the Congress leaders and the Working Committee for more than two weeks in explaining and clarifying whatever points were raised by the Congress and the Muslim League. True, there also was that rigidity, that the fundamentals of the Cripps proposals were not open to any modification, and that was the reason why he failed. But Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari are out-Heroding Herod. This is pure and simple dictation and not a sincere desire to negotiate. In the first place, Mr. Rajagopalachari is an expelled member of the Congress, and whatever individual efforts he may have made were by virtue of the approval of Mr. Gandhi to his proposals during Mr. Gandhi's incarceration. But once Mr. Gandhi is released and is a free man, it is up to Mr. Gandhi personally to deal with this grave problem of the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question, and there is no need of any go-between. But Mr. Gandhi is too ill, and in his recent interview, when any question was put to him, he directed the questioner to Mr. Rajagopalachari, and the Press representatives have been told that he had personally subscribed to Rajaji's offer when he was fasting in prison camp. "It is now 16 months old. For the rest of the offer, I must carry out the contract between Rajaji and myself. He is to bear the brunt of all criticism that might be made about that offer." It is a pity that he gave no indication of this in his famous letter dated 4th May 1943, which still remains undelivered to me, and it has got a new name now, it is not a "formula" but an "offer".

As regards Mr. Gandhi, who says he has subscribed to this offer, but according to Mr. Rajagopalachari, it is a "joint contribution" and "formula", the question arises, in what capacity can Mr. Gandhi's

association be judged, for he also is not even a fouranna member of the Congress. He has got so many capacities—his personal capacity, his capacity as the Dictator of the Congress, and above all, his Mahatmaic divine authority, which is guided by his inner voice, and he is a Satyagrahi and the sole interpreter of what it means and stands for. He is not a Hindu but a “Sanatanist”, and he follows Hinduism of his own. It is rather difficult to know as to what capacity Mr. Gandhi will use at a given time. Mr. Gandhi, I hope, will be good enough to study the constitution, rules and regulations of the All-India Muslim League, and that he will understand better my position as the President of a really well organized and democratic body, viz., the All-India Muslim League, for I remember when Mr. Gandhi met Lord Linlithgow in September 1939, after the outbreak of the war, he broke down and tears rolled down from his eyes when he visualized the possible destruction by bombing of the Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament, and said: “What was the use of Indian freedom if England and France were defeated?”, he in a statement declared his wholehearted and most enthusiastic support for the prosecution of the war. But hardly a week thereafter, the Congress Working Committee decided to non-cooperate if their demand for immediate independence, etc. was not met, and as a first step the Congress members of the Central Assembly were ordered to withdraw. Mr. Gandhi turned round and said they were right, he was only in a minority of one, and advised Lord Linlithgow to come to terms with the Congress, approving of their decision.

Now we come to the merits of the proposal. In this case we are told by Mr. Rajagopalachari, to

quote his own words of the series of telegrams which were released by him:—

“Mr. Gandhi, though not vested with representative or special capacity in this matter, definitely approved of my proposal and authorized me to approach you on that basis. Weight of his opinion would most probably secure Congress acceptance.”

Mr. Rajagopalachari in his statement of July 16th from Panchgani starts with an absolutely untrue and misleading statement. He says that “It is now two years since I started work, even though I had secured Gandhiji’s unqualified support to the scheme and it **conceded all that the Muslim League had ever demanded in its Resolution of 1940.**” If this is so, why not say we accept the League Resolution of 1940? His formula is a parody, a negation of and intended to torpedo the Muslim League’s Resolution of March 1940, and when he says that his formula concedes all that the Muslim League had ever demanded by its resolution, it is the grossest travesty. First of all, where does he find any mention of “plebiscite” of any kind in that resolution? Then why this ridiculous proposal of a plebiscite districtwise? But let me take clause by clause some important points of Mr. Rajagopalachari’s formula.

First, take the preamble, the basis of the terms which, if accepted, will completely bind the Muslim League, whereas the Mahatma may withdraw his blessings, as he is not speaking, according to Mr. Rajagopalachari, with the authority of the Congress or in his representative capacity, whatever that may mean. Then we come to the first clause, “Subject to the terms set out below as regards the Constitution”. I do not see “the Constitution”

in this formula. Which Constitution does he refer to? Then comes the demand for our endorsing the Indian demand for independence. It implies that we are against the independence of the peoples of India, and both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari know that it is an un-called for insinuation to make, and they are casting an unwarranted reflection upon the Muslim League. Next comes the condition that we should co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period, thereby arrogating to the Congress a dominant and superior position and requiring our co-operation, as a subordinate body, with this leading organisation, and as to the kind of provisional interim Government for the transitional period that is to be formed, no indication is given as to its form, character, personnel, its powers, etc. After the termination of the war a Commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the North-West and East of India, and a plebiscite of all the inhabitants would be held districtwise where the Muslim population is in absolute majority. It is not stated who will appoint this Commission, what will be its personnel and its powers, and who will enforce its findings. Really, how can Mr. Rajagopalachari stand unabashed and make a public statement that his formula concedes all that the Muslim League's Resolution of March 1940 demands? It would be open to all parties to advocate their point of view before a plebiscite is held, although this agreement is intended to be only between the Congress and the League. Next, in the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce, and communications, and for other essential purposes. The question arises, safeguarding these matters

from whom and what does it mean? These mutual agreements are made obligatory, and it is not very easy to understand the significance of this clause. Then comes the last clause, which is the height of ingenuity. These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the government of India. But it does not say to whom, how and when.

According to the latest statement by Mr. Gandhi, the August Resolution is "absolutely innocuous", and that while his authority has lapsed, the August Resolution has not lapsed. Let it now collapse, for the Muslims do not regard it as innocuous, as both the demand and the sanction for it to force this demand are inimical to the Muslim ideals and demands. Let Mr. Gandhi join hands with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan in plain and unequivocal language, and we shall be nearer the independence of the peoples of India, which is so dear to the heart of not only Mr. Gandhi but of millions in this country. Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari are putting the cart before the horse when they say that all these clauses can have any value or can become effective only if Great Britain transfers power to India, save and except acting on his latest seven points and immediately establishing a National Government of Mr. Gandhi's conception. There is no chance of it unless the Hindus and Muslims come to a settlement and unite and thus by means of a united front wring out our freedom from the unwilling hands of the rulers of Great Britain.

I am sorry if by expressing my views honestly and freely and in self-defence, I have hurt anybody's feelings. I purposely did not wish to say anything when Mr. Gandhi was good enough to

release to the Press his famous letter to me dated May 4th 1943. I refused to say a single word throughout the period commencing from the release of Mr. Gandhi up to date. I refused to say anything when abruptly the correspondence was closed and released to the Press by Mr. Rajgopalachari. I had expected along with the millions of people in this country, that Mr. Gandhi would review and revise the entire situation and give a correct lead, having regard to the realities and conditions prevailing in India. But I think in fairness to the Muslim League and to myself, I must now put our case before the bar of the world opinion, and particularly the public opinion of Hindus and Muslims in this land, as by the tactics of Mr. Rajgopalachari, as approved by Mr. Gandhi I am forced to do so. But out of evil cometh good. I do not mind all the vilification and misrepresentation and the base campaign that is carried on against me. But at last, and it is to the good and conducive to further progress, Mr. Gandhi has at any rate in his personal capacity, accepted the principle of partition or division of India. What remains now is the question of how and when. This has got to be carried out. Mr. Gandhi knows and understands the position better than any living man, for in one of his articles in the "Harijan" he put the question of Pakistan demand in a nutshell. This is what he said:—"I hope Qaid-e-Azam does not represent the considered opinion even of his colleagues. Pakistan, according to him, in a nutshell, is a demand for carving out of India a portion to be wholly treated as an independent and sovereign state."

I am glad that Mr. Gandhi realises that 1944 is not 1942. It is so in more senses than one, and he may further take into consideration that 1939-40-41 is not 1944.

I hope I have made it clear that the procedure and method adopted is hardly conducive to friendly negotiations, and the form is pure dictation, as it is not open to any modification. This is not calculated to lead to fruitful results or a solution and settlement of the problem which concerns the destiny of a nation of 100 millions of Muslims and their posterity, and as regards the merits of the proposal, Mr. Gandhi is offering a shadow and a husk, maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan, and thus trying to pass off having met our Pakistan scheme and Muslim demand.

But since all these happenings I have received a letter from Mr. Gandhi dated July 17th, and I have already replied to him on July 24th from Srinagar before my departure. They are as follows. Let us therefore wait and see, hoping for the best.

I ask you to pray and give me your blessings. God willing, we may reach an honourable settlement.

*(Translation of Mr. Gandhi's letter in Gujarati)*

“Dilkusha”, Panchgani,  
17-7-1944.

Brother Jinnah,

There was a day when I could induce you to speak in the mother tongue. To-day I take courage to write to you in the same language. I had invited you to meet me while I was in Jail. I have not written to you since my release. But to-day my heart says that I should write to you. We will meet whenever you choose. Don't regard me as the enemy of Islam or of the Muslims of this country. I am the friend and servant of not only yourself but of the whole world. Do not disappoint me.



(XVI)

I am enclosing herewith a translation of this letter in Urdu.

Your brother,  
GANDHI.

*(Mr. M.A. Jinnah's reply to Mr. Gandhi)*

H. B. "Queen Elizabeth",  
Srinagar Kashmir.  
24th July, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I received your letter dated 17th<sup>1</sup> of July here on the 22nd of July, and I thank you for it.

I shall be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay on my return, which will probably be about the middle of August. By that time I hope that you will have recuperated your health fully and will be returning to Bombay. I would like to say nothing more till we meet.

I am very very pleased to read in the Press that you are making very good progress, and I hope that you will soon be all right.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

JOINT STATEMENT SIGNED BY MR. JINNAH  
& MR. GANDHI RELEASED TO THE PRESS  
BY MR. JINNAH ALONG WITH THE TEXT  
OF CORRESPONDENCE ON THE EVENING  
OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1944.

"Mr. Gandhi from the very commencement of our talks made it clear that he had approached me in his individual capacity and that he represented no one but himself. However, he assured me that he was really open to conviction and conversion to the Muslim League Lahore Resolution of March 1940.

Without prejudice to my objection that in order to reach any settlement, negotiations can only be carried on properly when the other side is also fully represented and vested with authority, in deference to Mr. Gandhi's wishes I agreed to the task of persuading and converting him to the fundamentals of Lahore Resolution.

I have placed before him everything and every aspect of the Muslim point of view in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence, and we discussed all the pros and cons generally, and I regret to say that I have failed in my task of converting Mr. Gandhi.

We have, therefore, decided to release to the Press the correspondence that has passed between us.

Nevertheless, we hope that the public will not feel embittered, and we trust that this is the final end of our effort."

## JINNAH-GANDHI CORRESPONDENCE.

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated September 10:—

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

With reference to our talk yesterday, September 9th., I understood from you that you had come to discuss the Hindu-Muslim settlement with me in your individual capacity, and not in any representative character or capacity on behalf of the Hindus or the Congress nor had you any authority to do so. I naturally pointed out to you that there must be some one on the other side with authority holding a representative status with whom I can negotiate and, if possible, come to a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question, and that for the position you had adopted there was no precedent, and that this raises great difficulties in my way.

As you know, I can only speak on behalf of Muslim India and the All-India Muslim League, as the President of the organization which I represent, and as such I am subject to and governed by its constitution, rules and regulations. I think you realize and will admit that the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question is the foremost and the major hurdle.

and unless representatives of these two nations put their heads together, how is one to make any headway with it?

Nevertheless, I explained to you the Lahore resolution of March, 1940, and tried to persuade you to accept the basic and fundamental principles embodied in it, but you not only refused to consider it but emphasized your opposition to the basis indicated in that resolution and remarked that there was "an ocean between you and me." When I asked you what was then the alternative you suggested, you put forward the formula of Mr Rajagopalachari approved by you. We discussed it, and as various matters were vague and nebulous, and some required clarification, I wanted to have a clear idea of what it really meant and what were its implications, and asked you for explanation and clarification regarding the proposals embodied in that formula.

After some discussion, you requested me to formulate in writing my points that I thought required, or called for, an explanation and clarification and to communicate with you and that you would reply in writing before our next meeting on Monday, September 11, at 5-30 p.m. I am, therefore, submitting to you the following points which require clarification:-

(1) With regard to the preamble: in what capacity will you be a consenting party if any agreement is reached between you and me?

(2) Clause 1: With regard to "the constitution for a free India" referred to in this clause, I should like to know first—what constitution do you refer to, who will frame it and when will it come into being?

Next, it is stated in the formula that "the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence." Does it mean the Congress demand for independence as formulated in the August Resolution of 1942 by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay or, if not, what is the significance of this term, for you know the Muslim League has made it clear not only by its resolutions but by its creed, which is embodied in its constitution, that we stand for the freedom and independence of the whole of this sub-continent, and that applies to Pakistan and Hindustan.

Next, it is stated that the Muslim League "will co-operate with the Congress in its formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period" I should like to know the basis or the lines on which such a Government is to be set up or constituted. If you have a complete and definite scheme, please let me have it.

(3) Clause 2: Who will appoint the commission referred to in this clause and who will give effect to their findings? What is the meaning of absolute majority referred to in it? Will the contemplated plebiscite be taken districtwise or, if not, on what basis? Who will determine and decide whether such a plebiscite should be based on adult franchise or other practicable franchise? Who will give effect to the decision or verdict of the above-mentioned plebiscite? Would only the districts on the border, which are taken out from the boundaries of the present province by delimitation, be entitled to choose to join either state, or would also those outside the present boundaries have the right to choose to join either state?

(4) Clause 3: Who are meant by "all parties" in this clause?

(5) Clause 4: I should like to know between whom and through what machinery and agency will the "mutual agreements" referred to in this clause be entered into? What is meant by "safeguarding defence and commerce, communications and for other essential purposes?" Safeguarding against whom?

(6) Clause 5: "These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the Government of India." I should like to know to whom is this power to be transferred, through what machinery and agency and when?

These are some of the important points that occur to me for the moment, which require explanation and clarification, and I hope that you will let me have full details about the various points that I have raised in order that I may be better able to understand and judge your proposals before I can deal with them satisfactorily.

Yours sincerely  
M. A. JINNAH

Mr Gandhi's letter dated September 11, 1947

Dear Qaid-e Azam,

I received your letter yesterday at 3-30 pm. I was in the midst of appointments. I hasten to reply at the earliest opportunity.

I have said in my letter to you that I am in the Rajaji formula and I have stated explicitly that I have approached you as an individual. My life mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity and I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling power being ousted.

Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too, I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together.

I am glad, therefore, that you did not break off our talks when I refused to assume or accept representative capacity. Of course, I am pledged to use all the influence I may have with the Congress to ratify my agreement with you. May I remind you that the Rajaji formula was designed in the first instance for your acceptance and submission thereafter to the League?

It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in outlook. But that had no reference to the Lahore resolution of the League. The Lahore resolution is indefinite. Rajaji has taken from it the substance and given it a shape.

Now for the points raised by you.

1 I have already answered this in the foregoing

2. The constitution will be framed by the provisional government contemplated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after the British power is withdrawn. The independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands.

The basis for the formation of the provisional interim government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress.

3. The commission will be appointed by the provisional government. Absolute majority means a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the Frontier Province. The form of plebiscite and the franchise must be a matter for discussion.

4 "All parties" means parties interested.

5 "Mutual agreement" means agreement between contracting parties. "Safeguarding, defence, etc." means for me a central or joint board of control. Safeguarding means safeguarding against all who may put the common interests in jeopardy.

6. The power is to be transferred to the nation, that is to the provisional government. The formula contemplates peaceful transfer by the British Government. So far as I am concerned, I should like the transfer to take place as early as possible.

Yours sincerely.

M. K. GANDHI

Mr Jinnah's letter dated September 11:—

Dear Mr Gandhi.

I received your letter of September 11 at 5 p.m. today. I note that you have approached me as an individual and I have already expressed my views about it. Please do not take it that I acquiesce in the position that you have adopted for which there is no precedent. Nevertheless I proceeded to discuss matters with you because naturally I am anxious to convert you to my point of view if possible. I urged you that the only solution of India's problem is to accept



the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan, as briefly laid down in the Lahore resolution of March, 1940, and proceed to settle details forthwith.

You say the Lahore resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the terms of the resolution, but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and the fundamental principles embodied in it. I should, therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore resolution is indefinite. I cannot agree that Rajaji has taken from it its substance and given it shape. On the contrary, he has not only put it out of shape but mutilated it, as I explained in my speech which I delivered at the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on July 30.

You say the "first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together"

This, in my opinion, is, as I have repeatedly said, putting the cart before the horse, and is generally opposed to the policy and declarations of the All-India Muslim League. You are only holding on firmly to the August Resolution of 1942.

In order to achieve the freedom and independence of the peoples of India it is

essential, in the first instance the Government should be a Hindu-Muslim Government. Of course I am thankful to you for the fact that you are pledged to work in close co-operation with the Congress Government, but that is your own judgment, although it will be of great help to me. I once more ask you to let me know what is your conception of the formation of a provisional Government. No doubt, it will be a subject of discussion between the League and the Congress, but I think in fairness you should at least give me some rough idea or lines of your proposal. You must have thought it out by now, and I would like to know what are your proposals for the formation of a provisional interim government, which can give me some clear picture to understand it.

You have omitted to answer my question as to who will give effect to the findings of the commission, and also it is not clear to me what you mean by absolute majority. When you say it means "a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the Frontier Province." You have not even replied to my question as to who will decide the form of the plebiscite and the franchise contemplated by the formula.

The answer to the fourth point does not carry any clear idea when you say "all parties means parties interested."

You say "mutual agreement means agreement between contracting parties." Who are the contracting parties once a provisional interim government is established of your

conception? Who will appoint the central or joint board of control, which will safeguard defence etc, and on what principle, through what machinery and agency, and subject to whose control and orders will such a central or joint board be?

You say "the power is to be transferred to the nation, that is to the provisional government." That is all the greater reason why I would like to know full details of the provisional government as contemplated by you and of your conception.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

Mr Jinnah's letter dated September 13:—

Dear Mr Gandhi,

When you arrived here on the morning of the 12th to resume our talks you were good enough to inform me that you had not had time to attend to my letter of September 11th, which reached you the same day at 10-30. p. m. We met again today without having received your reply, and I am still waiting for it. Please therefore let me have your reply as soon as possible with regard to the various points mentioned in my letter to you of September 11th.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

Mr Gandhi's letter dated September 14:—

Dear Qaid-e-Azam.

I have your letter of 13th instant. I understood from our talks that you were in no hurry for my answer. I was therefore taking the matter in a leisurely fashion even hoping that as our talks proceeded and as cordiality increased, mutual clarification would come of itself and

that we would only have to record our final agreement. But I understand and appreciate the other viewpoint. We should take nothing for granted. I should clarify your difficulties in understanding the Rajaji formula and you should do likewise regarding yours, i.e. the Muslim League Lahore resolution of 1940.

With reference to the Lahore resolution, as agreed between us, I shall deal with it in a separate letter.

Perhaps at the end of our discussion we shall discover that Rajaji not only has not put the Lahore resolution out of shape and mutilated it but has given it substance and form. Indeed in view of your dislike of the Rajaji formula, I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement. So much for the first paragraph of your letter.

As to the second, I do hold that unless we oust the third party we shall not be able to live at peace with one another. That does not mean that I may not make an effort to find ways and means of establishing a living peace between us.

You ask for my conception of the basis for a provisional interim government. I would have told you if I had any scheme in mind. I imagine that if we two can agree it would be for us to consult the other parties. I can say this, that any provisional government to inspire confidence at the present moment must represent all parties. When that moment arrives, I shall have been replaced by some authoritative person, though you will have me always at your beck and call when you have converted me or I you, or by mutual conversion we have become one mind functioning through two bodies.

As to the third point, the provisional government being the appointing authority will give effect to the findings of the commission. This I thought was implied in my previous answer.

Rajaji tells me that absolute majority is used in his formula in the same sense as it is used in ordinary legal parlance wherever more than two groups are dealt with. I cling to my own answer. But you will perhaps suggest a third meaning and persuade me to accept it.

The form of the plebiscite and franchise must be left to be decided by the provisional interim government unless we decide it now. I should say it should be by adult suffrage of all the inhabitants of the Pakistan area.

As to the fourth, "all parties" means you and I and every one else holding views on the question at issue will and should seek by peaceful persuasion to influence public opinion as is done where democracy functions wholly or in part.

As to fifth, supposing that the result of the plebiscite is in favour of partition, the provisional government will draft the treaty and agreements as regards the administration of matters of common interest, but the same has to be confirmed and ratified by the governments of the two states. The machinery required for the settlement and administration of matters of common interest will in the first instance be planned by the interim government, but subsequently will be matter for settlement between the two governments acting through the agencies appointed by each for that purpose.

As to sixth, I hope the foregoing makes superfluous any further reply.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. GANDHI.

Mr Jinnah's letter dated September 14:—

Dear Mr Gandhi,

I received your letter of September 14th at 4-45 p.m. today in reply to my letter of September 11th (and not of September 13th as you state, which seems to be a mistake) and I thank you for it.

1. Please let me have as soon as you can your promised letter indicating in what way or respect the Lahore resolution is 'indefinite.'

2. With regard to to the provision in the Gandhi-Rajaji formula that "the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence," I asked you in my letter dated September 10th. "Does it mean the Congress demand for independence as formulated in the August 1942 Resolution by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay. or if not, what is the significance of this term," to which you replied by your letter of September 11th "The independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands." Hence I again ask, does it mean on the basis of an united India? I find that you have not clarified the point satisfactorily.

As regards the next part of this clause the formula proceeds to lay down that "the Muslim League will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of the provisional interim government for the transitional period," I requested you in my letter of September 10th to let me know on basis or the lines on which such a government be set up or constituted. If you have

and definite scheme, please let me have it," to which you replied by your letter of September 11th under reply that "the basis for the formation of the provisional interim government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress." But that is not meeting my request for clarification or giving me at least the outlines of such a government, and that is what I have been asking for. I hope that you do appreciate my point when I am requesting you to let me have rough outlines of the proposed provisional interim government according to the formula, so that I may have some idea. Of course, I can quite understand that such a provisional interim government will represent all the parties and would be of a character that will inspire confidence at the present moment of all the parties. I can quite understand that when the moment arrives certain things may follow, but before we can deal with this formula in a satisfactory manner I repeat again that, as it is your formula, you should give me a rough idea of the provisional interim government that you contemplate and of your conception. What I would like to know would be, what will be the powers of such a provisional interim government, how it will be formed, to whom it will be responsible, and what will be its composition, etc. You, being the sponsor of this Gandhi-Rajaji formula, should give me some rough idea and picture of it, so that I may understand what this part of the formula means.

In your letter of September 14th in reply to my letter of September 11th you inform me that you would have told me if you had any scheme in mind. "I imagine that if we two can agree

would be for us to consult the other parties", but that is just the point. Unless I have some outlines or scheme, however rough, from you, what are we to discuss in order to reach any agreement?

As regards the other matters which you have further explained. I have noted the explanation, and I do not think I need press you further, although some of them are not quite satisfactory.

Your sincerely,  
M. A JINNAH.

Mr Gandhi's letter dated September 15:—

Dear Qaid -e-Azam,

This is in terms of our talk of Wednesday, 13th instant.

For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji formula and with your assistance am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore resolution of the Muslim League.

You must admit that the resolution itself makes no reference to the two nations theory. In the course of our discussions you have passionately pleaded that India contains two nations, i.e. Hindus and Muslims and that the latter have their homelands in India as the former have theirs. The more our argument progresses, the more alarming your picture appears to me. It would be alluring if it was true. But my fear is growing that it is wholly untrue. I find no parallel in history for a body of people and their descendants claiming to have come from the parent stock. If India was divided before the advent of Islam it would be in spite of the change of faith of her children.



You do not claim to be a separate nation by right of conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam? Will Bengalis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamilians, Maharashtrians, Cujaratis etc., cease to have their special characteristics if all of them became converts to Islam? These have all become one politically because they are subject to one foreign control. They are trying today to throw off that subjection.

You seem to have introduced a new test of nationhood. If I accept it, I would have to subscribe to many more claims and face an insoluble problem. The only real though awful test of our nationhood arises out of our common political subjection. If you and I throw off this subjection by our combined effort we shall be born a politically free nation out of our travail. If by then we have not learnt to prize our freedom we may quarrel among ourselves and for want of a common master holding us together in his iron grip seek to split up into small groups or nationalities. There will be nothing to prevent us from descending to that level and we shall not have to go in search of a master. There are many claimants to the throne that never remains vacant.

With this background I shall present you with my difficulty in accepting your resolution.

(1) Pakistan is not in the resolution. Does it bear the original meaning Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan out of which the name was mnemonically formed? If not what is it?

(2) Is the goal of Pakistan Pan-Islam?

3. What is it that distinguishes an Indian Muslim from every other Indian, if not his religion? Is he different from a Turk or an Arab?

4. What is the connotation of the word "Muslim" in the resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of the India of geography or of the Pakistan to be?

5. Is the resolution addressed to the Muslims by way of education, or to the inhabitants of the whole of India by way of appeal or to the foreign ruler as an ultimatum?

6. Are the constituents in the two zones to constitute "independent states" an undefined number in each zone?

7. Is the demarcation to take place during the pendency of British rule?

8. If the answer to the last question is in the affirmative, the proposal must be accepted by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within by the free-will of the people of India!

9. Have you examined the position and satisfied yourself that these "independent states" will be materially and otherwise benefitted by being split up into fragments?

10. Please satisfy me that these independent sovereign states will not become a collection of poor states, a menace to themselves and to the rest of India.

11. Pray show me by facts and figures or otherwise how independence and welfare India as a whole can be brought about by acceptance of the resolution?

12. How are the Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme?

13. What is your definition of "minorities"?

14. Will you please define the "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" for minorities referred to in the second part of the resolution?

15. Do you not see that the Lahore Resolution contains only a bare statement of the objective and does not give any idea as to the means to be adopted for the execution of the idea and the concrete corollaries thereof? For instance,

(a) are the people in the regions falling under the plan to have any voice in the matter of separation and, if so, how is it to be ascertained?

(b) What is the provision for defence and similar matters of common concern contemplated in the Lahore Resolution?

(c) There are many groups of Muslims who have continuously expressed dissent from the policy of the League. While I am prepared to accept the preponderating influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason, is it not our joint duty to remove their doubts and carry them with us by making them feel that they and their supporters have not been practically disfranchised?

(d) Does this not lead again to placing the resolution of the League before the people of

the zone concerned as a whole for acceptance ?

As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India. Believe me I approach you as a seeker. Though I represent nobody but myself, I aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India, for I realise in my own person their misery and degradation which is their common lot irrespective of class, caste or creed. I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses. I want you to use your influence for their welfare, which must include the rest.

In this hastily written letter I have only given an inkling of my difficulty.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

Mr Gandhi's letter dated September 15:—

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

I have yours of the 14th instant, received at 9-40 a.m.

I woke up at 3 a.m. today to finish my promised letter on the Lahore resolution.

There is no mistake about the date for I wrote in answer to your reminder of the 13th instant.

Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. Resolution of 1942. But it cannot be on the basis of a united India. If we come to a settlement it would be on the basis of the settlement, assuming of course that it secures general acceptance in the

y. The process will be somewhat  
 is. We reach by joint effort independ-  
 for India as it stands. India become  
 free will proceed to demarcation, plebiscite  
 and partition if the people concerned vote  
 for partition. All this is implied in the  
 Rajaji formula.

As to the provisional interim Government I  
 am afraid I cannot carry my answer any further  
 than I have done. Though I have no scheme  
 for the provisional Government, if you have one  
 in connection with the Lahore Resolution, which  
 also I presume requires an interim Government,  
 we can discuss it.

The formula was framed by Rajaji in good  
 faith. I accepted it in equal good faith. The  
 hope was that you would look at it with favour.  
 We still think it to the best in the circumstances.  
 You and I have to put flesh on it, if we can. I  
 have explained the process we have to go  
 through. You have no objection to it. Perhaps  
 you want to know how I would form the provi-  
 sional Government if I was invited thereto. If  
 I was in that uneviable position I would see  
 all the claimants and endeavour to satisfy them.  
 My co-operation will be available in that task.

I can give you full satisfaction about your  
 inquiry, "what I would like to know would be,  
 what will be the powers of such a provisional  
 interim Government, how it will be formed, to  
 whom it will be responsible". The provisional  
 interim Government will be responsible to  
 the elected members of the present Assembly  
 or a newly elected one. It will have all the  
 powers less that of the commander-in-chief

during the War and full powers thereafter. It will be the authority to give effect to the agreement that may be arrived at between the League and the Congress and ratified by the other parties.

Your sincerely,  
M. K. GANDHI

Mr Jinnah's letter dated September 17:—

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have your letter of September 15th, and I thank you for it. I note that you have for the moment shunted the Rajaji formula and are applying your mind very seriously to the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League. It is my duty to explain the Lahore Resolution to you to-day and persuade you to accept it, even though you are talking to me, as you have often made it clear, in your individual capacity. I have successfully converted non-Muslim Indians in no small number and also a large body of foreigners, and if I can convert you, exercising as you do tremendous influence over Hindu India, it will be no small assistance to me, although we are not proceeding on the footing that you are carrying on these talks in your representative character or capacity, and my difficulties remain until you are vested with a representative status and authority in order to negotiate and reach an agreement with you.

You have stated in your letter dated September 11th that the Lahore Resolution is "indefinite". I therefore naturally asked you to please let me know in what way or respect the Lahore

Resolution is indefinite, and now I have received your letter of September 15th under reply.

The third paragraph of your letter is not seeking clarification but a disquisition and expression of your views on the point whether the Mussalmans are a nation. This matter can hardly be discussed by means of correspondence. There is a great deal of discussion and literature on this point which is available, and it is for you to judge finally, when you have studied this question thoroughly, whether the Mussalmans and Hindus are not two major nations in this sub-continent. For the moment I would refer you to two publications, although there are many more, Dr. Ambedkar's book and "M.R.T's" Nationalism in Conflict in India. We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of International Law we are a nation. Now I shall proceed to reply to your various points —

1. Yes, the word "Pakistan" is not mentioned in the Resolution and it does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore Resolution.

2. This point does not arise, but still I reply that the question is a mere bogey.

3. This point is covered by my answer that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. As to the last part of your query, it is hardly relevant to the matter of clarification of the Resolution.

4. Surely you know what the word 'Muslims' means.

5. This point does not arise by way of clarification of the text of the Lahore Resolution.

6. No. They will form units of Pakistan.

7. As soon as the basis and the principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution are accepted, the question of demarcation will have to be taken up immediately.

8. In view of my reply to (7), your question (8) has been answered

9. Does not relate to clarification.

10. My answer to (9) covers this point.

11. Does not arise out of the clarification of the Resolution. Surely this is not asking for clarification of the Resolution. I have in numerous speeches of mine and the Muslim League in its Resolutions have pointed out that this is the only solution of India's problem and the road to achieve freedom and independence of the peoples of India.

12. 'Muslims under the Princes'. The Lahore Resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the Resolution.



13. The definition of "minorities". You yourself have often said minorities means "accepted minorities".

14. The adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities referred to in the Resolution are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective states, viz., Pakistan and Hindustan.

15. It does give basic principles and when they are accepted, then the details will have to be worked out by the contracting parties.

(a) does not arise by way of clarification

(b) does not arise by way of clarification

(c) The Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organization of Muslim India.

(d) No. See answer (c).

As regards your final paragraph, before receiving clarifications from me you have already passed your judgment and condemned the Lahore Resolution, when you say "As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India" I understand that you have made clear to me that you represent nobody but yourself, and I am trying to persuade you and to convert you that this is the road which will lead us to the achievement of freedom and independence not only of the two major nations, Hindus and Muslims but of the rest of the peoples of India, but when you proceed to say that you aspire to



Mr. Gandhi's letter dated September 19:—

*ID MUBARAK.*

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

Many thanks for yours of 17th instant.

I am sorry to have to say that your answers omitting 1, 2 and 6 do not give satisfaction.

It may be that all my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore Resolution. But I contend that they are very relevant from the standpoint of a seeker that I am. You cannot expect any one to agree to or shoulder the burden of the claim contained in the Lahore Resolution without for instance answering my questions 15 (a) and 15 (b) which you brush aside as not arising by way of clarification.

Dr. Ambedkar's thesis while it is ably written has carried no conviction to me. The other book mentioned by you, I am sorry to say, I have not seen.

Why can you not accept my statement that I aspire to represent all the sections that compose the people of India? Do you not aspire? Should not every Indian? That the aspiration may never be realized is beside the point.

I am beholden to you, inspite of your opinion about me, for having patience with me, I hope you will never lose it but will persevere in your effort to convert me. I ask you to take me with my strong views and even prejudices, if I am guilty of any.

As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ. For, I am



cation, so I have perforce to deal with them. Let me first deal with your letter of September 11th.

You say "My life mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together."

The gist of your letters up to date is that you are wedded to this policy and will pursue it. In your next letter of September 14th, while you were good enough to furnish me with the clarification of the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, you were pleased to observe, "I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore Resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement". In your letter of September 15th, you say "Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. Resolution of 1942." It is therefore clear that you are not prepared to revise your policy and that you adhere firmly to your policy and programme which you have persisted in and which culminated in your demand, final policy, programme, and the method and sanction for enforcing it by resorting to mass civil disobedience in terms of 8th August 1942 resolution, and you have made it more clear again by stating in your letter of September 19th as follows:—  
"As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ. For I am wholly

pentant." You know that the August 1942  
 Resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands  
 of Muslim India. Then again in the course of  
 the discussion when I asked you for clarification  
 of the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, you were pleased  
 to say, by your letter of September 15th, as  
 follows:- 'For the moment I have shunted the  
 Rajaji formula and with your assistance am  
 applying my mind very seriously to the famous  
 Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League.' We  
 discussed it in its various aspects, as you told  
 me you were open to be persuaded and con-  
 verted to our point of view. I discussed the  
 Resolution at great length with you, and  
 explained everything you wanted to understand,  
 even though you have emphasized more than  
 once that you are having these talks with me  
 in your personal capacity, and in your letter of  
 September 15th you assured me in the following  
 words with regard to the Lahore Resolution:  
 "Believe me I approach you as a seeker, though  
 I represent no body but myself", and that you  
 were open to conviction and conversion. You  
 had informed me by your letter of September  
 11th as follows:- 'It is true that I said an ocean  
 separated you and me in outlook. But that  
 had no reference to the Lahore Resolution of  
 the League. The League resolution is indefinite,  
 I naturally therefore proceeded, in reply, to  
 ask you by my letter of September 11th as  
 follows:- "You say the Lahore Resolution is  
 indefinite. You never asked me for any clarifi-  
 cation or explanation of the terms of the Resol-  
 ution, but you really indicated your emphatic  
 opposition to the very basis and the fundamental  
 principles embodied in it. I would therefore  
 like to know in what way or respect the Lahore  
 Resolution is indefinite", and I sent you

reminder on September 13th to which you replied by your letter of September 15th, not confining yourself really to matters of clarification, but introducing other extraneous matters, with some of which I had already dealt, in reply to this letter of yours of September 15th, by my letter of September 17th and furnished you with all the clarifications, informing you that you had introduced several matters which could hardly be discussed in a satisfactory manner by means of correspondence. I have already given you all the clarifications you require so far as the Lahore Resolution goes and its text is concerned. You again raise further arguments, reasons and grounds and continue to persist in a disquisition on the point, amongst others, whether Muslims of India are a nation, and then you proceed further to say: "Can we not agree to differ on the question of 'two nations' and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination." It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word "Self-Determination." Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the various positions that you have adopted in the course of our correspondence, as indicated above, can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birthright? Whereas you are labouring under the wrong idea that "self-determination" means only that of "a territorial unit" which by, the way, is

neither demarcated nor defined yet, and here is no Union or Federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign Central Government. Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign states by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing Union which is non-existent in India. The right of self-determination which we claim postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be the self-determination of the Mussalmans, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right.

I hope you will now understand that your question 15 (a) does not arise out of the Lahore Resolution or of any part thereof. As to 15 (b), again it does not arise as a matter of clarification, for it will be a matter for the constitution-making body chosen by Pakistan to deal with and decide all matters as sovereign body representing Pakistan vis-a-vis the constitution-making body of Hindustan or any other party concerned. There cannot be defence and similar matters of "common concern," when it is accepted that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent sovereign states. I hope I have now given all satisfactory explanations over and above the matter of clarification of the Lahore Resolution, in the hope of converting you as an individual "seeker"

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.



Mr Gandhi's letter dated September 22: —

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

Your letter of yesterday (21st inst.) so disturbed me that I thought I would postpone my reply till after we had met at the usual time. Though I made no advance at our meeting I think I see somewhat clearly what you are driving at. The more I think about the two nation's theory the more alarming it appears to be. The book recommended by you gives me no help. It contains half truths and its conclusions or inferences are unwarranted. I am unable to accept the proposition that the Muslims of India are a nation distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of India. Mere assertion is no proof. The consequences of accepting such a proposition are dangerous in the extreme. Once the principle is admitted there would be no limit to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions which would spell India's ruin. I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be.

You seem to be averse to a plebiscite. In spite of the admitted importance of the League, there must be clear proof that the people affected desire partition. In my opinion all the people inhabiting the area ought to express their opinion specifically on this single issue of division. Adult suffrage is the best method but I would accept any other equivalent.

You summarily reject the idea of common interest between the two arms. I can be no willing party to a division which does not

provide for the simultaneous safeguarding of common interests such as defence, foreign affairs and the like. There will be no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity.

Your letter shows a wide divergence of opinion and outlook between us. Thus you adhere to the opinion often expressed by you that the August 1942 resolution is "inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India" There is no proof for this sweeping statement.

We seem to be moving in a circle. I have made a suggestion. If we are bent on agreeing, as I hope we are, let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. GANDHI.

Mr Jinnah's letter dated September 23:—

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 22nd, and thank you for it. I am sorry that you think I have summarily rejected the idea of common interest between two arms, and and now you put it somewhat differently from 15 (b), when you say there will be no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity. My answer, already given, is that it will be for the Constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hindust, or any

other party concerned, to deal with such matters on the footing of their being two independent states.

I am really surprised when you say there is no proof of what you characterize as a sweeping statement of mine, that the August 1942 resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India. The resolution in its essence is as follows :—

(a) immediate grant of complete independence and setting up immediately of a federal central Government on the basis of a united democratic Government of India with federated units or provinces, which means establishing a Hindu raj.

(b), that this National Government so set up will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly, which will be chosen by adult franchise, which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India, which means that the constituent assembly chosen will be composed of an overwhelming majority of the Hindus, nearly 75 per cent.

(c) to enforce this demand of the Congress the August resolution decides on and sanctions a resort to mass civil disobedience at your command and when ordered by you as the sole dictator of the Congress.

This demand is basically and fundamentally opposed to the ideals and demands of Muslim India of Pakistan, as embodied in the Lahore

Resolution, and to enforce such a demand by means of resort to mass civil disobedience is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India, and if you succeed in realising this demand, it would be a death-blow to Muslim India. I see from the correspondence and talks between you and me that you are still holding fast to this fateful resolution.

From the very first day of our talks you made it clear to me, and you have repeatedly said in the course of our correspondence and talks, that you have approached me in your individual capacity, and you assured me that you were a seeker of light and knowledge and that you seriously and earnestly wanted to understand the Lahore Resolution and were open to conviction and conversion. Therefore in deference to your wishes I made every effort all these days and in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence to convert you, but unfortunately it seems I have failed. And now you have made new suggestions and proposals by your letter under reply:

(1) You say "I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be". I really do not know what this means, and I would like you to elaborate this proposal and give me some rough outlines of this new idea of yours, as to how and when the division is to take place. and in what way it is different from the division envisaged by the Lahore Resolution.

(2) You say "let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us". May I point out that you have repeatedly made clear to me that you are having these talks as an

individual seeker? How can any question of a third party or parties to guide or arbitrate between us arise?

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

Mr. Gandhi's letter dated September 23:—

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

Last evening's talk has left a bad taste in the mouth. Our talks and our correspondence seem to run in parallel lines and never touch one another. We reached the breaking point last evening but, thank God, we were unwilling to part. We resumed discussion and suspended it in order to allow me to keep my time for the evening public prayer.

In order that all possible chance of making any mistake in a matter of this great importance may be removed I would like you to give me in writing what precisely on your part you would want me to put my signature to.

I adhere to my suggestion that we may call in some outside assistance to help us at this stage.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. GANDHI.

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated September 23:—

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 23rd. May I refer you to my letter of to-day's date which I sent to you in reply to yours of September 22nd? I have nothing new or fresh to add, but I may say that it is not a case of your being asked to put your signature as representing any body till you clothe yourself with represent-



Differing from you on the general basis I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore of 1940 on my basis and on the following terms :—

The areas should be demarcated by a Commission approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.

If the vote is in favour of separation it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into two sovereign Independent States. There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be the matters of common interest between the contracting parties.

The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two states.

Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course





(3) You do not accept that they alone are entitled to exercise this right of theirs for self-determination

(4) You do not accept that Pakistan is composed of two zones, North-West and North-East, comprising six provinces, namely Sindh, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore Resolution. The matter of demarcating and defining the territories can be taken up after the fundamentals above mentioned are 'accepted, and for that purpose machinery may be set up by agreement.

You do not accept the provisions embodied in the Lahore Resolution for safeguarding the minorities, and yet in your letter under reply you say "With your assistance, I am exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreement so that the claim embodied in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore may be reasonably satisfied", and proceed to say "you must therefore have no apprehensions that the August Resolution will stand in the way of our reaching an agreement "

I have already clearly explained to you that the August resolution, so long as it stands, is a bar, for it is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore Resolution. You then proceed to say "that resolution dealt with the question of India as against Britain and it cannot stand in the way of our settlement". I am not at present concerned with Britain, but the August Resolution, as I have already stated, is against the ideals and demands of the Muslim League. Further, there is the resolution of

Jagat Narayan Lal, passed by the All-India Congress Committee in May 1942 at Allahabad, which, in express terms, lays down as follows :-

“The A.I.C.C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component state or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different states and provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal.”

These two resolutions, so long as they stand, are a complete bar to any settlement on the basis of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan. It is open to the Congress to revise and modify them, but you are only speaking in your individual capacity, and even in that capacity you are holding fast to the August Resolution and you have given no indication of your attitude regarding Jagat Narayan Lal's resolution. I have repeatedly made it clear after we had discussed the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, as you maintained that, to use your own language. “Rajaji not only has not put the Lahore Resolution out of shape and mutilated it but has given it substance and form,” and proceeded to say “Indeed in view of your dislike of the Rajaji formula, I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore Resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement”. When I asked for further clarification, which you furnished me by your letter of

September 15th, you started by saying "I have shunted the Rajaji formula and with your assistance I am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League". and thence forward the Gandhi-Rajaji formula was not discussed any further, and the question of your representative character and authority, which I had pointed out from the very commencement, therefore did not arise, as you had given me the task of converting you to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution, and ever since we discussed the Lahore Resolution only at great length and examined the pros and cons. and finally you have rejected it. As a result of our correspondence and discussions I find that the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and it does not come from your heart, and suddenly at the eleventh hour you put forward a new suggestion, consisting only of two sentences by your letter of September 22nd, saying, "I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers if a division there must be". I naturally asked you what this new suggestion of yours meant and wanted you to give me rough outlines of this new idea of yours as to how and when the division is to take place and in what way it is different from the division envisaged in the Lahore Resolution, and now you have been good enough to give me your amplification, in your letter of September 24th under reply, in which you say : "Differing from you on the general basis I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore 1940 on *my basis* and on the following terms". The terms clearly indicate that your basis is in vital conflict with

and is opposed to the fundamental basis and principles of the Lahore Resolution. Now let me take your main terms :—

(a) "I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the North West zones i.e., Baluchistan, Sindh, North West Frontier Province and that part of the Punjab where they are in absolute majority over all the other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India." If this term were accepted and given effect to, the present boundaries of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk, and it is opposed to the Lahore Resolution.

(b) That even in these mutilated areas so defined, the right of self-determination will not be exercised by the Muslims but by the inhabitants of those areas so demarcated. This again is opposed to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution.

(c) That if the vote is in favour of separation they shall be allowed to form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign dominations, whereas we propose that we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately by our united front and efforts do everything in our power to secure the

and independence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.

(d) Next you say "There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce and the like which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interests between the contracting parties". If these vital matters are to be administered by some central authority, you do not indicate what sort of authority or machinery will be set up to administer these matters, and how and to whom again that authority will be responsible. According to the Lahore Resolution, as I have already explained to you, all these matters, which are the life-blood of any state, cannot be delegated to any central authority or government. The matter of security of the two states and the natural and mutual obligations that may arise out of physical contiguity will be for the constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hindustan, or other party concerned, to deal with on the footing of their being two independent states. As regards the safeguarding of the rights of minorities, I have already explained that this question of safeguarding the minorities is fully stated in the Lahore Resolution.

You will therefore see that the entire basis of your new proposal is fundamentally opposed

to the Lahore Resolution, and as I have already pointed out to you, both in the correspondence and in our discussions, it is very difficult for me to entertain counter-proposals and negotiate and reach any agreement or settlement with you as an individual unless they come from you in your representative capacity. That was the same difficulty with regard to the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, and I made it clear to you, at the very outset, but the formula was discussed as you asserted that it had met the Lahore Resolution in substance, but while you were furnishing me with the clarification of this formula, you shunted it and we confined ourselves to the Lahore Resolution, and hence the question of your representative capacity did not arise regarding this formula. But now you have, in your letter of September 24th made a new proposal of your own on your own basis, and the same difficulties present themselves to me as before, and it is difficult to deal with it any further unless it comes from you in your representative capacity.

I cannot agree with you when you finally wind up by saying "In your letter of 23rd September you refer to the basis and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution and ask me to accept them. Surely this is unnecessary when as I feel I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance". This is obviously far from correct. Why not then accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution and proceed to settle the details?

Yours sincerely,  
M.A. JINNAH.

Mr. Gandhi's letter dated September 25:—

Dear Qaid-i-azam,

Yesterday's talk leads me to inflict this letter on you which I trust you will not mind.

Our conversations have come about as a result of your correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his formula and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon, and my own letter to you suggesting a meeting between you and me. My proposal of yesterday is an earnest effort to meet the essential requirements of the Lahore Resolution. I would like you therefore to think fifty times before throwing an offer which has been made entirely in the spirit of service in the cause of communal harmony. Do not take, I pray, the responsibility of rejecting the offer. Throw it on your Council. Give me an opportunity of addressing them. If they feel like rejecting it, I would like you to advise the Council to put it before the open session of the League. If you will accept my advice and permit me I would attend the open session and address it.

You are too technical when you dismiss my proposal for arbitration or outside guidance over points of difference. If I have approached you as an individual, and not in any representative capacity, it is because we believe that if I reach an agreement with you it will be of material use in the process of securing a Congress-League settlement and acceptance of it by the country. Is it irrelevant or inadmissible to supplement our efforts to convince each other with outside help, guidance, advice or even arbitration?

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. GANDHI.

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated September 26:—

Dear Mr Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 25th. It is entirely incorrect and has no foundation in fact for you to say that our conversations have come about as a result of my correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his formula. It is equally baseless to say "and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon". It was entirely in response to your letter of July 17th 1944 which I received while I was at Srinagar, with a fervent request on your part to meet you, and you ended that letter by saying "Do not disappoint me". In my reply, again from Srinagar dated July 24th 1944 I intimated to you that I would be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay on my return, which would probably be about the middle of August. This was long before the meeting of the Working Committee or that of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, and long before I reached Lahore, and when you arrived here and told me that you were approaching me in your individual capacity, I at once made it clear to you and informed you, both in our talks and by my letter, that the position you had taken up had no precedent for it, and further that it was not possible to negotiate and reach an agreement unless both the parties were fully represented. For it is one-sided business, as it will not be binding upon any organization in any sense whatever, but you would as an individual only recommend it, if any agreement is reached, to the Congress and the country, whereas it would be binding upon me as the President of the Muslim League. I cannot accept this position



I hope you do see the unfairness and the great disadvantage to me, and it is so simple and elementary for any one to understand.

As regards your proposal of yesterday, which you have amplified in your letter of September 24th I have already sent you my reply.

With regard to your suggestion to be allowed to address the meeting of the Council, and if they feel like rejecting your 'offer', the matter should be put before the open session, let me inform you that only a member or delegate is entitled to participate in the deliberations of the meetings of the Council or in the open session respectively. Besides, it is a most extraordinary and unprecedented suggestion to make. However, I thank you for your advice.

As regards your proposal for arbitration and outside guidance, I have already replied to you and it is not merely technicality but a matter of substance. I fully reciprocate your desire of securing a Congress-League settlement.

However I regret, I have failed to convince you and convert you, as I was hopeful of doing so.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

Mr. Gandhi's letter dated September 26:—

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

In view of my letter to you of yesterday, left to myself, I would have refrained from dealing with your letter before our meeting today. But I have deferred to Rajaji's advice to finish the chain of correspondence.

I confess I am unable to understand your persistent refusal to appreciate the fact that the formula presented to you by me in my letter of the 24th as well as the formula presented to you by Rajaji give you virtually what is embodied in the Lahore Resolution providing at the same time what is absolutely necessary to make the arrangement acceptable to the country. You keep on saying that I should accept certain theses which you call the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution, while I have been contending that the best way for us who differ in our approach to the problem is to give body to the demand as it stands in the resolution and work it out to our mutual satisfaction. It is on this plan that I understand Rajaji's formula to be conceived and it is on the same plan that I have tried to work it out in the course of and as a result of our talks. I contend that either gives you the substance of the Lahore Resolution. Unfortunately you reject both. And I cannot accept the Lahore Resolution as you want me to, especially when you seek to introduce into its interpretation theories and claims which I cannot accept and which I cannot ever hope to induce India to accept.

Your constant references to my not being clothed with representative authority are really irrelevant. I have approached you so that if you and I can agree upon a common course of action I may use what influence I possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. If you break, it cannot be because I have no representative capacity or because I have been unwilling to give you satisfaction in regard to the claim embodied in the Lahore Resolution.

Yours sincerely  
M. K. GANDHI

Mr Jinnah's letter dated September 26:—

Dear Mr Gandhi,

I have received your letter of September 26th, and I note that you have written it with Rajaji's advice. Of course, it is for you to follow such advice as you may choose to do so, but I am only concerned for the moment with you. I note that at the last moment you have resurrected the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, although it was shunted all this time, and you proceed to say that this formula gives me virtually what is embodied in the Lahore Resolution. You further say that on the same plan you have tried to formulate your latest proposals, as mentioned in your letter of September 24th and you maintain that either gives me the substance of the Lahore Resolution. In your previous letter you asserted that your formula gives me the "essence" of the Lahore Resolution. I see very close family resemblance between the two, and the substance of one or the other is practically the same, only it is put in different language, and I have already expressed my opinion that in my judgement they neither meet the substance nor the essence of the Lahore Resolution. On the contrary, both are calculated to completely torpedo the Pakistan demand of Muslim India. I have never asked you accept certain theses nor have I introduced any theories in the Lahore Resolution. Theses and theories are matters for scholars to indulge in.

I am sorry I have to repeat, but I am compelled to do so, that I cannot agree with you that my references to your not being clothed with

representative authority are really irrelevant. On the contrary, they have an important bearing, as I have already explained to you more than once. You again repeat that if you and I can agree upon a common course of action, you may use what influence you possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. I have already stated from the very beginning that that is not enough, for the reasons I have already given. Your representative capacity comes into play when you are making counter proposals, and I cannot understand how you can say that it is irrelevant. No responsible organization can entertain any proposal from any individual, however great he may be, unless it is backed up with the authority of a recognized organization, and comes from its fully accredited representative. However, I need not labour this point any more, as I have already explained it in our previous correspondence.

If a break comes, it will be because you have not satisfied me in regard to the essence of the claim embodied in the Lahore Resolution. It is not a question of your being unwilling, but in fact it is so. If a break comes it will be most unfortunate. If one does not agree with you or differs from you, you are always right and the other party is always wrong, and the next thing is that many are waiting prepared, in your circle, to pillory me when the word goes, but I must face all threats and consequences, and I can only act according to my judgment and conscience.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

representative authority are really irrelevant. On the contrary, they have an important bearing, as I have already explained to you more than once. You again repeat that if you and I can agree upon a common course of action, you may use what influence you possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. I have already stated from the very beginning that that is not enough, for the reasons I have already given. Your representative capacity comes into play when you are making counter proposals, and I cannot understand how you can say that it is irrelevant. No responsible organization can entertain any proposal from any individual, however great he may be, unless it is backed up with the authority of a recognized organization, and comes from its fully accredited representative. However, I need not labour this point any more, as I have already explained it in our previous correspondence.

If a break comes, it will be because you have not satisfied me in regard to the essence of the claim embodied in the Lahore Resolution. It is not a question of your being unwilling, but in fact it is so. If a break comes it will be most unfortunate. If one does not agree with you or differs from you, you are always right and the other party is always wrong, and the next thing is that many are waiting prepared, in your circle, to pillory me when the word goes, but I must face all threats and consequences, and I can only act according to my conscience.

## MR. GANDHI'S FIRST SPEECH AFTER THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS.

At the end of the evening public prayer which took place immediately after his last interview with Mr. Jinnah on September 27 Gandhiji addressed the audience. Speaking in Gujrati, he said he was not addressing them in Hindustani as before because he wanted his words to go straight to the hearts of the audience most of whom were Gujratis. He had particularly the women in mind who were not accustomed to Hindustani speech.

He had told them that when the talks were over he would let them know the result. That stage had been reached the day before but as copies of the correspondence were not ready its actual release had to be postponed till that day. Authorized copies of the correspondence had now been sent to the Press with a prefatory statement by the Qaid-i-Azam.

Hitherto he had told them that he was not without hope with regard to the outcome of the talks. He had to confess that the result that he was hoping for had not materialized. But he had no sense of disappointment or despondency. He was convinced that even out of that breakdown good would result.

Although the Qaid-i-Azam and he had known each other fairly well in public life before, they had never come into such close personal contact. Their conversations were carried out with friendliness and cordiality. He wanted all the communities to cultivate the same spirit of

friendliness and cordiality in their relations with one another. They should try to convert one another through it.

They might ask, why was it then that he and the Qaid-i-Azam had failed to convert each other? His reply was that he had tried his level best to go as far as he could to meet the Qaid-i-Azam's viewpoint. He had taken incalculable pains to understand him and to make himself understood. But he had failed.

He had placed before the Qaid-i-Azam Rajaji's formula but that did not commend itself to him. He had thereupon put forth another proposal of his own in its place but even that had failed to secure Jinnah Saheb's approval. In the same way, Jinnah Saheb's proposal had failed to commend itself to him. If either of them had been weak, they would have possibly come to some sort of agreement but as responsible men they could not afford to be weak. A helmsman had to be firm and unwavering or else the ship would founder upon the rocks. Each one of them had tried to convince the other. It was possible that both of them might be in the wrong. But so long as each felt himself to be in the right he could not let go his hold.

The news of the breakdown he knew would cause grief to the friends of India and might give cause for jubilation to their enemies. He drew their attention to the last sentence in their statement in which he had said that it was not the final end of their effort.

Although they had been unable to appreciate each other's view-point, the public could help them to do so. They should not lose heart. If there was any one who had reason to feel disappointed it was he. He had knocked at the Qaid-i-Azam's door. But as he had already observed there was no despondency in him. It was not for a votary of truth and non-violence to feel despondent if his effort at times failed to yield the result aimed at. Failure should only serve as spur to further effort. God alone knew what was best for them. It was not for them to question God's ways. Therefore, instead of feeling despondent they should regard the breakdown as a challenge to their faith and as an incentive for greater effort for establishing true unity among the various communities.

---



Mr. GANDHI's PRESS STATEMENT  
dated 28th SEPTEMBER 1944

"It is a matter of deep regret that we two could not reach an agreement. But there is no cause for disappointment. The breakdown is only so called. It is an adjournment sine die. Each one of us must now talk to the public and put our viewpoints before them. If we do so dispassionately and if the public co-operate, we may reach a solution of the seemingly insoluble at an early date. My experience of the precious three weeks confirms me in the view that the presence of the third power hinders the solution. A mind enslaved cannot act as if it was free. I need not impute base motives to the Rulers to prove what seems to me to be an axiomatic truth. Nevertheless, I am going to continue to work for the solution as I have been during these three weeks. The questions for consideration are simple. Has the Rajaji formula or mine made a reasonable approach to the Lahore Resolution? If they or either of them is such an approach all parties and especially the members of the Muslim League should ask the Qaid-i-Azam to revise his opinion. If Rajaji and I have stultified the Lahore Resolution we should be educated. The chief thing is for the Press and the

public to avoid partisanship and bitterness."

"I shall act as my inner voice tells me", replied Mr. Gandhi to a question on his future plans, whether he proposed to concentrate on a Hindu-Muslim settlement or take up political work, seeking imprisonment if necessary.

Asked how far the offer he had made had conceded the demand made in the Lahore Resolution of the League, Mr. Gandhi emphasized that the Rajaji formula, or the formula that he presented conceded the substance of the League demand.

"In my opinion, either formula gives as much as can reasonably be expected with due regard to the interests of the whole of India," he said.

In answer to a question whether his offer was to be treated now as withdrawn, he said that so far as he was concerned the offer he had made stood. It was not made in any bargaining spirit.

"I think," he said. "it is a just solution of the problem and it is in the spirit of the policy which the Congress has consistently adopted in connection with the communal question, namely, self-determination."

A number of questions were put on the representative character of the two leaders who conducted the negotiations and why Mr. Gandhi prolonged the talks when he was apprised of Mr. Jinnah's views on the first day of the talks.

Mr. Gandhi answered: "I am a man reputed to have inexhaustible patience and I have no reason to despair of either being converted by the Qaid-i-Azam or in my turn converting him. Therefore, so long as there was the slightest possibility, I clung to the hope that we shall pull

through to a solution. Haste in such cases is a most dangerous thing. You should, therefore, conclude that yesterday was really the moment when the public should have been taken into confidence."

"As for myself, I am entirely satisfied that we have not wasted these three weeks. I have no doubt whatsoever that we know now each other better than ever-before."

"When you agreed to meet Mr Jinnah, did you meet him on the basis that he was the sole representative of the Muslims?" asked a reporter.

Mr Gandhi replied: "I have never admitted that claim, but I have said throughout that the Muslim League is by far the most representative Muslim organization. It would have been folly on my part not to recognize this, but I have always been aware that there is outside the League a large body of Muslims which does not see eye to eye with the League and which does not believe in the two nations theory."

Mr Gandhi asserted that the fight for freedom had not been suspended when he approached the Qaid-i-Azam. "My approach to the Qaid-i-Azam was itself a part of the fight for freedom," he said.

Asked if there was any possibility of the two leaders meeting again in the near future, Mr Gandhi said: "I hope so. It is for the Press and the public to make it possible and hasten the date. I assure you that we have not parted as enemies, but as friends."

If the Rajaji formula or his own formula



spared no effort to accept the proposition or to make some other suggestions."

Mr. Gandhi was told that those Muslims who did not see eye to eye with the League had no real Muslim backing. He replied. "Therefore, I have said that the League is by far the more representative of Muslim opinion, but I cannot despise the others by simply saying that they have no Muslim backing. What does it matter if they have no more Muslim backing if the opinion represented by a single Muslim, or by a body of Muslims whom you can count on your fingers, is intrinsically sound? The way of approaching a question is not to examine the numerical strength of those behind the opinion, but to examine the soundness of the opinion on merits, or else we will never reach a solution, and if we reach one, it will be a blind solution simply because it is the wish of the largest body. If the largest body goes wrong, it is up to me to say you are wrong and not to submit.

"The rule of majority does not mean that it should suppress the opinion of even an individual, if it is sound. An individual's opinion should have greater weight than the opinion of many, if that opinion is sound on merits. That is my view of real democracy."

Mr. Gandhi was asked what thought of the idea of formation of provinces on religious, **cultural**

and communal basis. He replied that since 1920 he was for provinces on a linguistic basis.

As for redistribution on a cultural basis, he did not really know what it meant and he was unable to understand how provinces could be reconstituted on communal lines unless there was a suggestion that there should be inter-migration of the various communities to concentrate in particular areas. It seemed to him to be fantastic and impossible. "We are not," he said, "inhabiting a country full of deserts and wastelands. We are a densely populated country and I do not see the slightest chance for such redistribution."

"In that respect the Lahore Resolution is quite sound—where there is an obvious Muslim majority they should be allowed to constitute a separate State by themselves and that has been fully conceded in the Rajaji formula or my formula. There is not much distinction between them. That right is conceded without the slightest reservation. But if it means utterly independent sovereignty so that there is to be nothing in common between the two, I hold it is an impossible proposition. That means war to the knife. It is not a proposition that resolves itself into a voluntary or friendly solution.

"Therefore, the Rajaji formula and my formula have presented certain things to be in common between sovereign States. Therefore, there is no question of one party overbearing the other or the Centre having an overbearing Hindu majority. I think our formula should be critically and sympathetically examined and it would be found that the formula concedes everything that could reasonably

be conceded if we consider ourselves to be one family. Children of the same family, dissatisfied with one another by reason of change of religion, if they should separate, then the separation should be within ourselves and not separation in the face of the whole world. When two brothers separate, they do not become enemies of one another in the eyes of the world. The world will still recognize them as brothers."

A journalist said that some of the Nationalist Muslims felt that the Congress through Mr Gandhi meeting Mr Jinnah had put them in a false position and that they might have to change their attitude towards Indian nationalism.

Mr. Gandhi replied that it was an extraordinary suggestion. Nationalist Muslims were nationalists simply because they could not be otherwise. "I am a nationalist," he said, "not in order to please anybody, but because I cannot be otherwise. And if I approached the Qaid-i-Azam, I approached him in the common interests of myself and Nationalist Muslims and other Nationalists. Nationalist Muslims, so far as I know, were delighted when I approached the Qaid-i-Azam and were looking forward to a proper solution in the confidence that I would not sell the interests represented by them.

"Undoubtedly, a Nationalist Muslim represents the nation, but he represents the Muslims also who are a part of the nation. He would be guilty of disloyalty, if he sacrifices the Muslim interests. But my nationalism has taught me that I would be guilty of disloyalty, if I sacrifice the interests of a single Indian."

Asked if there was any difference between his present attitude towards the Muslim League demand and the stand he took in 1942, Mr. Gandhi said:

"There is very great difference. In 1942, Rajaji had not 'burst' on the scene as he did at the Aga Khan Palace with a concrete proposition. It reflects very great credit on his persistence. He never takes up a standpoint without the fullest consideration and having taken it up, he follows it to the bitterest end. He had abundant faith in my loyalty and he never gave me up as I have never given him up. When he found me in the Aga Khan Palace and presented the formula, I did not take even five minutes and I said 'Yes' because I saw it in a concrete shape.

"My mind is narrow. I have not read much literature. I have not seen much of the world. I have concentrated upon certain things in life and beyond that I have no other interest. Therefore, I could not realize the meaning of Rajaji's stand and I disliked it. But when he came with a concrete formula—I myself a concrete being of flesh and blood—and when he had put something in concrete shape, I felt I could hug it and touch it. Therefore, you see the vast difference between 1942 and today. However, thereby I have not departed from the Congress standpoint in general terms. Congress has accepted self-determination and the Rajaji formula has also accepted the principle of self-determination and therefore the formula had become common ground."

Proceeding, Mr. Gandhi explained that he accepted the principle of Sovereign States, consistent with friendliness. "Friendliness suggests," he said, "that before the whole world we must act as one nation, not united by extraneous circumstances, or united by force of British arms, but united by a greater force, that is, our own determined will."



## MR GANDHI'S INTERVIEW TO "NEWS-CHRONICLE" ON 29th SEPTEMBER 1944.

Mr. Gandhi told me why his talks with Mr. Jinnah failed to produce a solution of the Hindu-Muslim differences.

"I could not accept the two nations basis. This was Mr. Jinnah's demand. He wants immediate recognition of the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, the whole of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam as sovereign and completely independent Pakistan." He wants Mr. Gandhi to agree to this amputation from the rest of India without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants by plebiscite. He has rejected the Rajagopalachari formula. I asked Mr. Gandhi what he was prepared to recognise as Pakistan and on what basis there could be any hope of agreement in future. He was frank and precise. He replied, "I want to make it clear that I believe Mr. Jinnah is sincere, but I think he is suffering from hallucination when he imagines that an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned. It was my suggestion that provided there was the safeguard of a plebiscite there could be sovereignty for the predominantly Muslim areas, but it should be accompanied by bonds of alliance between Hindustan and Pakistan. There should be common policy and a working arrangement on foreign affairs, defence, communications and similar matters. This is manifestly vital to the welfare of both parts of India." This arrangement, Mr. Gandhi said, could not interfere with the internal life of Muslims who would not be subject in any way to Hindu domin-

ation. Such a division would not create an artificial split between people who whatever their religious faiths are descended from a common stock and are all Indians. "Unfortunately", said Mr. Gandhi, "Mr. Jinnah would have none of it and asked me to agree to the principle of two nations entirely separate." I asked Mr. Gandhi if he had adopted this attitude because he thought he could not 'sell' such a division to the country or because he thought it wrong in principle. He replied, "Because it is fundamentally wrong in principle. If I had thought Mr. Jinnah's view was right even though the whole world were against me I would have accepted it personally and given him my unquestioned allegiance." I then asked Mr. Gandhi, "If Mr. Jinnah agreed to your view of division, but insisted there should be no plebiscite or a plebiscite in which only Muslims would vote, would you settle on this basis?" Mr. Gandhi answered, "Never,. How could I agree in a personal or any other capacity to decide the future of millions of people without their having anything to say about their destiny?" "What", I asked "was your impression of Mr. Jinnah's attitude on the question of an interim National Government which you outlined to me in July?" Mr. Gandhi replied : "Mr. Jinnah has said that he is deeply interested in Independence, but it did not seem to me that he set as great store by it as immediate recognition of the Pakistan he wants. Whereas, you see, my view has been all along that we cannot be free among ourselves until we are free from imperial domination. We have parted as friends. These days have not been wasted. I am convinced that Mr. Jinnah is a good man. I hope we shall meet again. I am a man of prayer and I shall pray for understanding. In the meantime it is the duty of the public to digest the situation and bring the pressure of their opinion upon us."

## MR JINNAH'S STATEMENT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD on 4th OCTOBER 1944

"My attention has been drawn to Mr. Gandhi's Press statement which was published on Sept. 29. It is a pity that he thinks that the presence of a third party hinders a solution, and it was very painful to me when he said, "A mind enslaved cannot act as if it was free." No power can enslave the mind and soul of man, and I am sure Mr. Gandhi is the last person to allow his mind to be enslaved. I do hope that he will get over this depression from which he is perpetually suffering. We have to reach an agreement of our own and find a solution in spite of that third party.

As regards the other matters, Mr. Gandhi has unfortunately initiated his propaganda in right royal style, contrary to our joint statement. Apart from challenging the representative and authoritative status of the Muslim League he is inciting Musalmans against me, and he keeps on repeating the assertion throughout his statement that he has met the essence of the Lahore resolution by what he now calls his offer or offers in the shape of the Gandhi Rajaji formula and his own proposals which he put forth at the eleventh hour. Any intelligent man can now see that in substance there is no difference between the two. What he calls his own offer came after he had rejected all the essentials of the Lahore resolution, and the Gandhi-Rajaji formula was shunted from the very commencement. Now that the matter is subject to public discussion,

and as Mr. Gandhi is making statement after statement and giving interviews which are so misleading, I am compelled to deal with what he calls his offer. Let us examine at least the main points .

1. Immediate grant of Independence to India as one single national unit.

2. Immediate setting up of a national provisional interim government of his conception, as defined by him in his letter of September 15, which is as follows: A provisional interim government which will be responsible to the elected members of the present Assembly or a newly elected one. It will have all the powers less those of the Commander-in-Chief during the war, and full powers thereafter. It will be the authority to give effect to the agreement that may be arrived at between the Congress and the League. By the by, it does not only recognise the existence of a third party, but hands over to him all the powers of the Commander-in-Chief during the war, and the Defence, which is the most vital and overpowering Department. This clearly means the establishment immediately of a Central unitary or Federal government in charge of the entire civil administration with an over-whelming majority of Hindus in the Legislature, which will be not less than 75 per cent., to which the Cabinet will be responsible.

3. That when such a government is established it will be for this Government, so established, to frame the constitution of free India or it will set up an authority which will frame the constitution after the British Power is withdrawn.

4. That this National Government will draft the treaty and agreements as regards the administration of matters of common interest as now made clear in what he calls his own offer, namely, in matters such as foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce and the like which he maintains must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest under an efficient and satisfactory administration of a Central authority or government. This can only mean that all these vital matters which constitute the lifeblood of a State will remain vested in the national federal government proposed by him, to which finally full powers and responsibility for the Government of India will be transferred. It is therefore clear that the National Government will be brought into full being, established, and well in the saddle, according to these terms, with an overwhelming and solid majority of Hindus, which virtually would be a Hindu raj.

5. Then we are asked to agree to the most tortuous terms and accept the principle upon which areas are to be demarcated, namely district-wise, wherein the Muslim population is in an absolute majority, which according to Mr Gandhi means that only that district will be recognized in which the Muslims have something like 75 per cent of Muslim population: for he says that by absolute majority he means as in Sind, Baluchistan or the North-West Frontier Province, but according to Mr Rajagopalachari, an absolute majority means as understood in legal parlance. Apart from the fact that the joint authors already differ, I find from the dictionary meaning that it means 'a majority

of all members of a body (including those voting and those not voting)".

6. That in areas thus demarcated, there will be a promiscuous plebiscite on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise, and the form and the franchise will be decided again by the National Government referred to above, unless we can agree upon it beforehand.

It is when we have agreed to all these terms then alone comes the question of separation of those mutilated, broken areas again subject to further conditions: (1) This matter, can only be considered after the termination of the war, and (2) after the transfer of full power and responsibility for the Government of India to this National Government, and it will be then that this National Government will set up a Commission for demarcating contiguous districts as stated above, and complete its work of sheer vandalism, especially in the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam and then its findings will be given effect to by this National Government and if these poor areas so paralyzed desire to sever or separate from the all-India united, federal government, fully and firmly established, then they must submit to and go through a promiscuous plebiscite, and if the verdict is in favour of the Muslims even then all matters of vital importance, such as foreign defence, internal communications, culture, commerce and the like shall remain ve

in and continue to be administered by a Central authority or Government.

This is what Mr Gandhi calls a partition or division between two brothers, and it is really amazing that he should repeat ad nauseam that he has by his offer satisfied the essence or substance of the Lahore resolution. It would be difficult to conceive of a more disingenuous, tortuous and crooked assertion, which he keeps on repeating naively.

What is the use of misleading people and making confusion worse confounded? If we accept these terms, which present us with a veritable trap and a slough of death, it means the burial of Pakistan. But I see some ray of hope still when he says, "If Rajaji and I have stultified the Lahore resolution, we should be educated."

I tried to do so, as far as Mr Gandhi was concerned, for three weeks, but his ailment is so long standing and so chronic that it is beyond the reach of a physician.

I hope that his appeal to the press and the public to educate him will not fall on deaf ears. But when he was asked, what next, he was pleased to say "I shall act as the inner voice tells." For an ordinary mortal like me there is no room in the presence of his "inner voice."

Mr Gandhi may sincerely believe that he has complied with the essentials of the Lahore Resolution by his own offer or by the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, but it is pure imagination and a delusion. The language and the terms of both, as clarified by Mr. Gandhi, show they are like the Siamese Twins, and it is impossible to maintain that either of them satisfies any of the essentials embodied in the Lahore resolution.

His contradictions and inconsistencies even in a single letter, however short, are beyond measure, and the sum total of all that has happened during the past four weeks presents one with a Chinese puzzle. I will give one instance amongst many:

"Where there is an obvious Muslim majority, they should have the fullest right to constitute themselves into a separate State. But if it means utterly independent sovereignty so that there is nothing in common between the two, I hold it as an impossible proposition. Then it means a fight to the knife."

Here is an apostle and a devotee of non-violence threatening us with a fight to the knife, and according to him the talks have only been adjourned sine die. But apart from that, what kind of separate States does he then concede to the obvious Muslim majority in their national homelands!

Mr Gandhi, perhaps under provocation, again asserted that he has never admitted the claim of the Muslim League as the only authoritative organization of the Muslims, and darkly hinted that there are other Muslim organizations with a large body of Muslim opinion behind them who do not see eye to eye with the League and do not support the two-nation theory. Thereby he has again made an attempt to discredit the Muslim League and disrupt the Mussalmans, for he knows that that is not true. Of course no nation can attain absolute and complete unanimity, cent. per cent.

In one breath Mr Gandhi agrees to the principle of division, and in the next he makes proposals which go to destroy the very



foundations on which the division is claimed by Muslim India. On the one hand he wants a League-Congress agreement, and on the other he denies its representative character and authority to speak on behalf of the Mussalmans of India. Mr Gandhi is an enigma."

Mr Jinnah elucidated a number of questions put by Pressmen regarding the boundaries of the Pakistan State. He was asked if any machinery would be set up to decide the case of predominantly non-Muslim border areas of their intention to join Pakistan or Hindustan. Mr Jinnah referred a questioner to the Lahore resolution which stated that the division should be on the basis of the present boundaries of the six provinces, i.e. the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Sind, Bengal, Assam and Baluchistan, subject to territorial adjustments that might be necessary. He emphasised the words "subject to" and explained that territorial adjustments did not apply to one side only but to both sides, Hindustan and Pakistan. "I made it clear," Mr. Jinnah said, "that if we agree on the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution then the question of demarcating or defining the boundaries can be taken up later in the same way as a question of boundaries arising between two nations is solved. It will be like one Government negotiating with the other and arriving at a settlement.

"But there are no Governments here," interrupted a reporter. Mr. Jinnah said that the two parties would set up constitution making bodies which would deal with the matter or even before that they might arrive at an agreement. "Is there any possibility of your meeting Mr. Gandhi in the near future?" he was asked. Mr. Jinnah said, "Mr.

Gandhi says that it depends on the inner voice. I have no admission to that place. I cannot say."

The Muslim League President was asked whether he had any scheme for the constitution of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah said that the principle of Pakistan should be first accepted and the scheme would be formulated thereafter. Further explaining the point, Mr. Jinnah referred to a previous question, namely, the absence of two contracting Governments on behalf of Hindustan and Pakistan, and said that it was true there were no 'de jure' Governments. If the principle of division was accepted then it followed that both Hindustan and Pakistan would have to choose their own constitution-making bodies. Those bodies as representing two sovereign States would deal with questions of mutual and natural relations and obligations by virtue of the physical contiguity, and they would then as two independent sovereign States—two nations—come to an agreement on various matters.

"Take the case of the continents of America," he said: "There are 25 independent sovereign states in South and North America. They have their treaties and agreements with regard to their mutual interests. Even so, the States in Europe have their own agreements with each other for trade, commerce, and even alliances. These are things that can be adjusted. Agreements and treaties are entered into even between two countries that have no physical contiguity. Here, the two nations are neighbours and have physical contiguity."

Earlier, Mr. Jinnah said that one important issue which he had dealt with in his statement was whether the offer or offers of Mr. Gandhi have either of them satisfied the essence or substance of the Lahore resolution. He had explained the

position fully. "Mr. Gandhi says," Mr. Jinnah added, "that if his formula or Rajagopalachari's formula stultified the Lahore Resolution, then they should be educated. To that my answer is : 'I have made my contribution for 21 days and am still making that contribution; and, so far as the public is concerned, I hope it will not fall on deaf ears.' Mr. Gandhi in his statements and interviews has attempted to discredit the League and cause disruption among Mussalmans, I naturally resent it and he will get his answer."

MR. JINNAH'S INTERVIEW TO THE  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "NEWS  
CHRONICLE", LONDON, ON  
4th OCTOBER 1944.

"There is only one practical, realistic way of resolving Muslim-Hindu differences. This is to divide India into the two sovereign parts of Pakistan and Hindustan by the recognition of the whole of the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, Bengal and Assam as sovereign Muslim territories as they now stand, and for each of us to trust the other to give equitable treatment to Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in Hindustan. We are prepared to trust twenty-five million Muslims to them if they will trust us." This view was expressed to me to-day by Mr. Jinnah in a two and a half hour conversation on his talks with Mr. Gandhi. "The offer made to us", said Mr. Jinnah, "is an insult to intelligence. I was asked to agree to a plebiscite where Muslims are not in absolute majority. What was meant by absolute majority? I asked Mr. Gandhi. His reply meant that only where we are more than seventy per cent of the entire population should we be given control without a vote. In this he differed from Mr. Rajagopalachari, who said we should accept the legal definition of absolute majority, which means fifty-one per cent of the entire population of an election area, including

people who do not vote—not fifty-one per cent of the poll. A child can see that no party could hope to secure this. So I am asked to agree to a plebiscite which will probably leave a mutilated and unworkable Pakistan. This plebiscite would take place after the war and after I had agreed to co-operate in an interim National Government in which seventy five per cent of the seats will be held by Hindus. It would therefore be a Hindu majority Government, which would, when it becomes a permanent federal Government, set up the post-war Commission for demarcating frontiers and arranging the plebiscite. I am asked to agree, before the plebiscite and therefore before I know what Pakistan will be, to working arrangements on defence, finance, foreign affairs, commerce, customs, communications, etc., as a condition of our being allowed to have any kind of Pakistan at all, and it will be with a seventy-five per cent Hindu majority Government with which we shall have to agree. What should we have left? A Pakistan probably pitted with islands of Hindustan not only on the frontiers but deep within Pakistan territory and further subject to control over these most vital matters of this National Government. This is not independence. It is a form of provincial autonomy subject always in the most vital matters to an overwhelmingly Hindu federal authority. So long as Muslims are in minority, and they always will be, any such arrangement must leave us dependent on the Hindu majority rule. I asked Mr. Gandhi to define the

Constitution under which such a Federation would work. These are matters of fundamental importance. How could I agree to the scrapping of the present Constitution and framing of a new one as a substitute, as proposed by Mr. Gandhi on the basis of a united India democratic, parliamentary Government which would come into operation at once. If we agree to this, the question of Pakistan would be shelved to Doomsday and practically buried. That is what Mr. Gandhi wanted me to do. 'If you do not give me what I want', says Mr. Gandhi, 'I will reserve the right to resort to mass civil disobedience.' I cannot be accused of being pro-British. No Indian worthy of the name wants foreign domination. But don't you see that if I agreed to join this threat, it could only be by my accepting the Congress demands, which are opposed to Pakistan, and if the British Government surrendered, Muslim India would be faced not only by Hindu majority rule but a Hindu majority triumphant with British co-operation. If Mr. Gandhi does not mean to resort to civil disobedience, he should say so and withdraw the August Resolution. He doesn't withdraw it. He re-emphasizes it. The fact is the Hindus want some kind of agreement which will still give them some form of control over Muslims. They will not reconcile themselves to our complete independence. There was another fundamental obstacle in our way. Mr. Gandhi talked in his personal capacity, I as the President of the Muslim League. I told him: if we agree and my Committee rejects the agreement, I am discredited. If your Committee turns you down, you can say I was talking as an individual and you are as you were. Mr. Gandhi has also said that the presence of the British

impedes our agreement. There are some British who do not want agreement, but there is nothing to prevent us agreeing. We have free minds and souls. No power can frustrate our coming to any agreement in ten minutes if the Muslim claim to complete independence is recognized. Then only we shall have true co-operation between Muslim and Hindu. It will be freely given by men who are masters in their own houses and not because one is subject to the domination of another and must therefore submit to the other's point of view."

MR. JINNAH'S INTERVIEW TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "DAILY WORKER"  
LONDON ON 5TH OCTOBER 1944.

In reply to the request of the Correspondent to explain the Pakistan demand to non-Muslim lovers of freedom Mr. Jinnah said: "To understand the Pakistan demand in its full significance it is to be borne in mind that the six Provinces, viz., N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Sind, the Punjab in the North-West, and Bengal and Assam in the North-East of this sub-continent, have a population of 70 million Muslims and total population of Muslims would not be less than 70 per cent. The rest is composed of Hindus, tribal people and untouchables. It is in these zones that Muslims wish to establish Pakistan as an independent State."

How is Pakistan the Muslims' demand for freedom? asked the Correspondent. Mr. Jinnah replied: "It is the Muslims' demand for freedom because Muslims in Pakistan want to be able to establish their own real democratic popular Government. This Government will have the sanction of the mass of the population of Pakistan and will function with the will and sanction of the entire body of people in Pakistan, irrespective of caste, creed or colour."

Will Pakistan have any neighbourly relations with Hindustan? asked the Correspondent again.



Mr. Jinnah said: , "Certainly Pakistan will have neighbourly relations with Hindustan like any other two independent national States. I have said so several times. We will say "Hands off India", to all outsiders. Pakistan will not tolerate any outside design or aggression on this subcontinent. We will observe something like Monroe Doctrine." Asked about the British Government's attitude towards his demand, Mr. Jinnah said. "British die-hard ruling class will be more opposed than anybody else to Pakistan materialising because, in my judgment, that is the only way of getting freedom in the quickest and surest way. They know it. In their secret dispatches, statements and documents they have made it clear since India Bill was introduced and when Crown assumed the Government of India, that when they say United India, they mean perpetuation of British Imperialist domination. They have kept us on that line for nearly a century. They try to put Hindus and Muslims together artificially and unnaturally dangling in front of the idea of Hindu India or united democratic parliamentary Government for India as one national unit. It is impossible. It is only a manoeuvre to give them ultimately firm ground for saying as they did when enacting the Government of India Act 1935 that 'we cannot allow progress and welfare of India to be delayed because of your quarrels and we as chosen of God, have a mission and cannot wait till you agree. Therefore we will enact constitution and impose it upon the conflict-

ing elements as overlords'. In such a constitution neither Hindus nor Muslims nor any other section of the people will be free or independent."



## APPENDIX A.

### LAHORE RESOLUTION (1940) OF THE ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

“While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

Resolved that it is the the considered view of this Session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles,

viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This Session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."



defence, and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility of the governance of India."

## APPENDIX C.

### Mr. Gandhi's Proposal Dated 24th Sept. 1944.

"The areas should be demarcated by a Commission approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.

If the vote is in favour of separation it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into two sovereign independent States.

There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs: defence, internal communications, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.

The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two States.

Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of independence of India.

The League will however be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League may not be willing to participate."



## APPENDIX D.

### JAGAT NARAIN LAL'S RESOLUTION OF THE ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE

"The A.-I.C.C. is of the opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by the giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and provinces and the country as a whole, and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal."

## APPENDIX E.

### AUGUST 1942 RESOLUTION OF THE ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE.

"The All-India Congress Committee has given the most careful consideration to the reference made to it by the Working Committee in their resolution dated July 14, 1942, and to subsequent events, including the development of the war situation, the utterances of responsible spokesmen of the British Government, and the comments and criticisms made in India and abroad. The Committee approves of and endorses that resolution, and is of opinion that events subsequent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.

"The Committee has viewed with dismay the deterioration of the situation on the Russian and Chinese fronts and conveys to the Russian and Chinese peoples its high appreciation of their heroism in defence of their freedom. This increasing peril makes it incumbent on all those who strive for freedom and who sympathise with the victims of aggression, to examine the foundations of the policy so far pursued by the Allied Nations, which have led to repeated and disastrous failure. It is not by adhering to such aims and policies and methods that failure can be converted into success,

for past experience has shown that failure is inherent in them. These policies have been based not on freedom so much as on the domination of subject and Colonial countries, and the continuation of the Imperialist tradition and method. The possession of Empire, instead of adding to the strength of the ruling power, has become a burden and a curse. India, the classic land of modern Imperialism, has become the crux of the question, for by the freedom of India will Britain and the United Nations be judged, and the peoples of Asia and Africa be filled with hope and enthusiasm.

"The ending of British rule in this country is thus a vital and immediate issue on which depend the future of the war and the success of freedom and democracy. A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism. This will not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations, and give these nations, whose ally India would be, the moral and spiritual leadership of the world. India in bondage will continue to be the symbol of British Imperialism and the taint of that imperialism will affect the fortunes of all the United Nations.

"The peril of today, therefore, necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promises or guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce the needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the war.

“The A.I.C.C., therefore, repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence, a provisional Government will be formed and free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The provisional Government can only be formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India. Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command, together with its Allied Powers, and to promote the well being and progress of the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially all power and authority must belong. The provisional Government will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This constitution, according to the Congress view, should be a federal one, with the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. The future relations between India and the Allied Nations will be adjusted by representatives of all these free countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and for their co-operation in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom will enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strength behind it.

“The freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to this freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must

also attain their complete freedom. It must be clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other Colonial Power.

“While the A. I. C. C. must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this hour of danger, the Committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all. On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a world federal defence force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression.

“An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operate on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems.

“Such a federation should be open to all nations who agree with its fundamental principles. In view of the war, however, the federation must inevitably, to begin with, be confined to the United Nations, such a step taken now will have a most powerful effect on the war, on the peoples of the Axis countries, and on the peace to come.

“The Committee regretfully realizes, however, that despite the tragic and overwhelming lessons of

the war and the perils that overhang the world, the Governments of few countries are yet prepared to take this inevitable step towards world federation. The reactions of the British Government and the misguided criticism of the foreign Press also make it clear that even the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted, though this has been made essentially to meet the present peril and to enable India to defend herself and help China and Russia in their hour of need. The Committee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defence of China or Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be preserved, or to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the United Nations. But the peril grows both to India and these nations, and inaction and submission to a foreign administration at this stage is not only degrading India and reducing her capacity to defend herself and resist aggression, but is no answer to that growing peril and is no service to the peoples of the United Nations. The earnest appeal of the Working Committee to Great Britain and the United Nations has so far met with no response and the criticisms made in many foreign quarters have shown an ignorance of India's and the world's need, and sometimes even hostility to India's freedom, which is significant of a mentality of domination and racial superiority which cannot be tolerated by a proud people conscious of their strength and of the justice of their cause.

"The A. I. C. C. would yet again, at this last moment, in the interest of world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the United Nations. But the Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavouring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian Government which dominates over it and prevents it from functioning in its own interest

and in the interest of humanity. The Committee resolves, therefore, to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale, so that the country might utilize all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last 22 years of peaceful struggle. Such struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji and the Committee requests him to take the lead and guide the nation in the steps to be taken.

"The Committee appeals to the people of India to face the dangers and hardships that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and to hold together under the leadership of Gandhiji and carry out his instructions as disciplined soldiers of Indian freedom. They must remember that non-violence is the basis of this movement. A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committees can function. When this happens every man and woman who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India.

"Lastly, whilst the A. I. C. C. has stated its own view of the future governance under free India, the A. I. C. C. wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on mass struggle, it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India".

